查看更多>>摘要：We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold for mechanisms with two alternatives in the range. For partially knit and strict environments, we prove that ex post incentive compatibility extends to groups, and that strategy-proofness implies strong group strategy-proofness in the special case of private values. The results extend to mechanisms operating on non-strict domains under an additional requirement of respectfulness. We discuss examples of environments where our theorems apply. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We consider a fixed network of players endowed with idiosyncratic preferences over actions and involved in interactions of various types. The aim is to investigate the interplay between idiosyncratic preferences and interactional incentives on a network. The earlier literature demonstrated the conflict between players' intrinsic preferences and coordination incentives. This paper shows that such a conflict is also present in contexts in which players do not necessarily aim at coordination with their peers. The introduction of action preferences changes equilibrium outcomes in a non-trivial fashion: some equilibria disappear, while other, qualitatively new ones, appear. We characterize equilibria for a large class of games, including games of strategic complements and strategic substitutes, and outline a subclass with a unique equilibrium in which all players follow their idiosyncratic action preferences. This equilibrium is Pareto optimal and for many games is also a unique efficient profile. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：The Chairman Paradox (Farquharson, 1969) is a classical observation in voting games showing that a Chairman endowed with tie-breaking power might end up with her worst outcome. The analysis posits three players whose preferences build a Condorcet cycle and invokes Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies (IEWDS) to select a unique equilibrium. However, IEWDS is a controversial procedure which exhibits well-known weaknesses. This work relies on non-controversial equilibrium refinements instead. For any cardinal payoffs representing the preferences, two pure-strategy equilibria are trembling-hand perfect, the paradoxical one and another one where the Chairman attains her best outcome. The original paradox is restored (and shown not to actually depend on IEWDS) if one considers the stronger concept of proper equilibrium. The analysis casts new light on a classical paradox and illustrates the difference between properness and trembling-hand perfection in a relevant example. (C) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.
Williams, Steven R.Zachariadis, Konstantinos E.Satterthwaite, Mark A.
27页
查看更多>>摘要：We investigate equilibrium in the buyer's bid double auction (BBDA) in a model with correlated private values/costs. Using a combination of theorems and computed examples, we demonstrate that simple equilibria exist even in small markets. Moreover, we bound traders' strategic behavior as a function of market size and derive rates of convergence to zero of (i) inefficiency in the allocation caused by strategic behavior and (ii) the error in the market price as an estimate of the rational expectations price. These rates together with computed examples suggest that strategic behavior can be inconsequential even in small markets in its effect on allocational efficiency and information aggregation. The BBDA thus simultaneously accomplishes both the informational and allocational goals that markets ideally fulfill; it does this perfectly in large markets and approximately in small markets, with the error due mainly to the smallness itself and not the strategic behavior of traders. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：This paper studies a mechanism design problem with networked agents and stochastically evolving private information. In contrast to the canonical mechanism design theory focusing only on information asymmetry, we also pay attention to the topology of social network among agents. We find that the standard first-order approach for mechanism design is invalid in dynamic environment. As a remedy, a novel ironing technique is proposed, which produces a perfectly sorting allocation. Based on the optimal dynamic mechanism obtained, we define and compare some important nodes and edges in a network for different ranges of synergy parameter. We further discuss the network intervention problem, in which the principal can intervene to change the ex-ante distribution of individual types. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：Experimental research on generosity has focused predominantly on behavior in the monetary domain, although many real-life decisions occur in the non-monetary domain. Investigating generosity preferences in the non-monetary domain is important for understanding a large class of situations ranging from effort provision at work to reducing individual CO2 emissions. This paper shows generosity differs between the monetary and non-monetary domains and that different social norms of allocation can predict greater levels of generosity in the non-monetary compared to the monetary domain. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Durbac, CalinaFountoulakis, NikolaosChellig, Jordan
30页
查看更多>>摘要：We consider evolutionary games on a population whose underlying topology of interactions is determined by a binomial random graph G(n, p). Our focus is on 2-player symmetric games with 2 strategies played between the incident members of such a population. Players update their strategies synchronously: each player selects the strategy that is the best response to the current set of strategies its neighbours play. We show that such a system reduces to generalised majority and minority dynamics. We further show rapid convergence to unanimity for p in a range that depends on a certain characteristic of the payoff matrix. In the presence of a bias among the pure Nash equilibria, we determine a sharp threshold on p above which the largest connected component reaches unanimity with high probability. For p below this critical value, we identify those substructures inside the largest component that block unanimity. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We consider a two-player game of war of attrition under complete information. It is well-known that this class of games admits equilibria in pure, as well as mixed strategies, and much of the literature has focused on the latter. We show that if the players' payoffs whilst in "war" vary stochastically and their exit payoffs are heterogeneous, then the game admits Markov Perfect equilibria in pure strategies only. This is true irrespective of the degree of randomness and heterogeneity, thus highlighting the fragility of mixed-strategy equilibria to a natural perturbation of the canonical model. In contrast, when the players' flow payoffs are deterministic or their exit payoffs are homogeneous, the game admits equilibria in pure and mixed strategies. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：Consider a market with two substitute products and a sequence of consumers. The consumers are uncertain about the quality of each product but obtain some private information about it. Additionally, each consumer observes the purchase decisions of her predecessors but not their private information. Absent prices, the standard logic of herding is that all but finitely many consumers may, with positive probability, select the lower quality product. One perspective in the literature is that informationally efficient market prices can resolve the herding inefficiency and induce asymptotic learning where the beliefs of consumers about product qualities converge to the truth. This paper shows that, while informationally efficient prices induce asymptotic learning, they also inflict a welfare cost. That is, we show that the expected welfare is decreasing in the frequency with which prices are set to be informationally efficient. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We study the existence of allocations of indivisible goods that are envy-free up to one good (EF1), under the additional constraint that each bundle needs to be connected in an underlying item graph. If the graph is a path and the utility functions are monotonic over bundles, we show the existence of EF1 allocations for at most four agents, and the existence of EF2 allocations for any number of agents; our proofs involve discrete analogues of the Stromquist's moving-knife protocol and the Su-Simmons argument based on Sperner's lemma. For identical utilities, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an EF1 allocation for any number of agents. For the case of two agents, we characterize the class of graphs that guarantee the existence of EF1 allocations as those whose biconnected components are arranged in a path; this property can be checked in linear time. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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