查看更多>>摘要：We study a model where evaluation consists of multiple components of different nature and (cardinal) performances in all components are aggregated into a summary index between 0 and 1. We propose what we call the normalizer-based aggregation rules and characterize them by individual separability, monotonicity, anonymity, and component independence. Each member in this family is distinguished by three parameters: (i) a profile of weights that determines the relative importance of each component; (ii) a profile of "individual normalizers" that converts an agent's performance in each component into a raw score (for that component) in the normalized scale of [0,1]; and (iii) a profile of "group normalizers" that adjusts a raw score for each component relative to all agents' performances. Given these parameters, the overall evaluation, or score, of an agent is obtained as a weighted average of his adjusted scores for all components produced by individual and group normalizers. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：In the last decade, social media and the Internet have amplified the possibility to circulate false information among an audience, which has become a serious threat to the credibility of politicians, organizations, and other decision makers. This paper proposes a framework for investigating the incentives to strategically manipulate the audience's belief under different institutions and in various competitive environments. We show that more rigorous institutions against information manipulation can lead to higher manipulation intensities in equilibrium. Complementary, we study what kind of competitive environment is particularly susceptible to the manipulation of information. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We show that right-continuous monotone strategies used in Markov perfect equilibria for economic growth models and related dynamic games can be recognised as members of the Hilbert space of square integrable functions of the state variable. We provide an application of this result to a bequest game and point out that this result also holds for the class of left-continuous monotone functions. The result is fundamental for using the Schauder fixed point theorem. Furthermore, it considerably simplifies the classical approach, where such strategies are represented by non-negative measures on the state space. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Weintraub, GabrielBergemann, DirkCastro, Francisco
17页
查看更多>>摘要：We compare the profit of the optimal third-degree price discrimination policy against a uniform pricing policy. A uniform pricing policy offers the same price to all segments of the market. Our main result establishes that for a broad class of third-degree price discrimination problems with concave profit functions (in the price space) and common support, a uniform price is guaranteed to achieve one half of the optimal monopoly profits. This profit bound holds for any number of segments and prices that the seller might use under third-degree price discrimination. We establish that these conditions are tight and that weakening either common support or concavity can lead to arbitrarily poor profit comparisons even for regular or monotone hazard rate distributions. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
NSTL
Elsevier