Pangallo, MarcoSanders, James B. T.Galla, TobiasFarmer, J. Doyne...
21页
查看更多>>摘要：Do boundedly rational players learn to choose equilibrium strategies as they play a game repeatedly? A large literature in behavioral game theory has proposed and experimentally tested various learning algorithms, but a comparative analysis of their equilibrium convergence properties is lacking. In this paper we analyze Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA), which generalizes fictitious play, best-response dynamics, reinforcement learning and also replicator dynamics. Studying 2 x 2 games for tractability, we recover some wellknown results in the limiting cases in which EWA reduces to the learning rules that it generalizes, but also obtain new results for other parameterizations. For example, we show that in coordination games EWA may only converge to the Pareto-efficient equilibrium, never reaching the Pareto-inefficient one; that in Prisoner Dilemma games it may converge to fixed points of mutual cooperation; and that limit cycles or chaotic dynamics may be more likely with longer or shorter memory of previous play. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
de Castro, LucianoGalvao, Antonio F.Noussair, Charles N.Qiao, Liang...
19页
查看更多>>摘要：Quantiles are used for decision making in investment analysis and in the mining, oil and gas industries. However, it is unknown how common quantile-based decision making actually is among typical individual decision makers. This paper describes an experiment that aims to (1) compare how common is decision making based on quantiles relative to expected utility maximization, and (2) estimate risk attitude parameters under the assumption of quantile preferences. The experiment has two parts. In the first part, individuals make pairwise choices between risky lotteries, and the competing models are fitted to the choice data. In the second part, we directly elicit a decision rule from a menu of alternatives. The results show that a quantile preference model outperforms expected utility for 32%-55%, of participants, depending on the metric. The majority of individuals are risk averse, and women are more risk averse than men, under both models. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We present results from laboratory experiments studying statistical discrimination and affirmative action. We induce statistical discrimination in simple labor-market interactions between firms and workers. We then introduce affirmative-action policies that vary in the size and duration of a subsidy that firms receive for hiring discriminated-against workers. These different affirmative-action policies have nearly the same effect, and practically eliminate discriminatory hiring practices. However, once lifted, few positive effects remain and discrimination reverts to its initial levels. One exception is lengthy affirmative-action policies, which exhibit somewhat longer-lived effects. Stickiness of beliefs, which we elicit, helps explain the observed outcomes. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We study how compliance with norms of pro-social behavior is influenced by peers' compliance in a dynamic and non-strategic experimental setting. We show that social proximity among peers is a crucial determinant of the effect. Without social proximity, norm compliance erodes swiftly because participants only conform to observed norm violations while ignoring norm compliance. With social proximity, participants conform to both types of observed behaviors, thus halting the erosion of compliance. Our findings stress the importance of the broader social context for norm compliance and show that, even in the absence of social sanctions, norm compliance can be sustained in repeated interactions, provided there is group identification, as is the case in many natural and online environments. (c) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
查看更多>>摘要：Equity motivates randomization, but often comes at the cost of efficiency. We study the tradeoff within the strategy-proof family of priority rules. Although randomization over all priority orders is incompatible with efficiency, we characterize the maximal subsets of priority for which randomization preserves efficiency: free-agent and adjacent-three families. Introducing equity measures for asymmetric rules, we show that mixtures within these subfamilies admit probabilistic guarantees that priority rules cannot deliver. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We conduct an ultimatum bargaining experiment but, rather than bargaining over money, subjects bargain over lottery tickets for a mutually exclusive prize. We find that proposers offer a significantly lower percentage of lottery tickets to responders than the equivalent offer when bargaining over money. In contrast, responders have a significantly higher acceptance threshold, which is consistent with responders being risk averse and possessing ex-post fairness concerns. This difference can be rationalized if proposers have incomplete information or incorrect beliefs about responders' preferences. We provide evidence supportive of proposers holding incorrect beliefs. Specifically, we observe an incongruence between how sensitive proposers expect responders to be to regret, and how sensitive responders are. By varying the timing of responders' decision, we show that intentions matter and present evidence of an anomaly in responders' preferences. Specifically, when responders decide after the resolution of uncertainty, they are more willing to accept extreme inequality. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：Markets differ in the availability of past trading records of their participants. In a repeated sale model with adverse selection, we study the impact of the availability of such records on trading outcomes. We consider regimes varying with respect to the length of the available records. We characterize a class of equilibria in which the record length has direct welfare implications via the market's need to re-screen the seller, as well as indirect implications via the low quality seller's incentives to mimic the high quality seller. As the record length increases, the market needs to re-screen less frequently, which improves efficiency. In turn, less frequent screening makes mimicking more attractive and limits the market's ability to learn. These considerations lead to a non-monotonic relationship between record length and overall gains from trade. (C) 2021 Published by Elsevier Inc.
查看更多>>摘要：We characterize the shape of spatial externalities in a continuous time and space differential game with transboundary pollution. We posit a realistic spatiotemporal law of motion for pollution (diffusion and advection), and tackle spatiotemporal non-cooperative (and cooperative) differential games. Precisely, we consider a circle partitioned into several states where a local authority decides autonomously about its investment, production and depollution strategies over time knowing that investment/production generates pollution, and pollution is transboundary. The time horizon is infinite. We allow for a rich set of geographic heterogeneities across states. We solve analytically the induced non-cooperative differential game and characterize its long-term spatial distributions. In particular, we prove that there exist a Perfect Markov Equilibrium, unique among the class of the affine feedbacks. We further provide with a full exploration of the free riding problem and the associated border effect. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：This paper models a scenario where finite perfect-information games are distorted in two ways. First, each player can have different possible levels of foresight, where foresight is a particular number of future stages that the player can observe/understand from each of her moves. In particular, each player's foresight is allowed to be "limited" or insufficient to observe the entire game from each move. Second, there is uncertainty about each opponent's foresight. I define the Limited Foresight Equilibrium (LFE) for this model. An LFE specifies how limited-foresight players' strategies and beliefs about opponents' foresight evolve as they move through the stages of the game. I show the existence of LFE and describe its other properties. I show that in LFE limited-foresight players follow simple heuristics for beliefs and actions. As applications, LFE is shown to rationalize experimental findings on Sequential Bargaining and the Centipede game. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：I study the impact of bid credits on simultaneous ascending auctions in a model where bidders potentially have complementary values. Although bid credits can lead to a more equitable distribution of items, I find an additional unintended consequence: bidders without credits are more exposed to winning a less desirable set of items and will drop out of the auction sooner when their competitors have credits. Calibrating the model to data from the Federal Communication Commission's sale of licenses in the 700 MHz guard bands, I find exposure reduced average non-credited dropout values by 5.7 percent but did not decrease revenues. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
NSTL
Elsevier