查看更多>>摘要：Adding candidates to a one-dimensional common-interest voting model, this paper shows that catering to centrist voters can lower social welfare. The electoral benefit of doing so is weak, so candidates polarize substantially in equilibrium, resolving a long-standing empirical puzzle. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We investigate the influence of self and social image concerns as potential sources of lying costs across two studies (n = 991). In Experiment 1, in a standard die-rolling paradigm, we exogenously manipulate self-awareness and observability, which direct the focus of a person on their private and public selves, respectively. We find that our self-awareness manipulation has no effect on overreporting in comparison to a control treatment, while our observability manipulation significantly decreases reports. In Experiment 2, we introduce a design that allows to compare the effects of self and social image concerns by directing the focus either on oneself or on an external observer while keeping constant the set of observers and their information. In line with the results from Experiment 1, people lie significantly less when their focus is on the external observer rather than on themselves. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：A well-intentioned principal provides information to a rationally inattentive agent without internalizing the agent's cost of processing information. Whatever information the principal makes available, the agent may choose to ignore some. We study optimal information provision in a tractable model with quadratic payoffs where full disclosure is not optimal. We characterize incentive-compatible information policies, that is, those to which the agent willingly pays full attention. In a leading example with three states, optimal disclosure involves information distortion at intermediate costs of attention. As the cost increases, optimal information changes from downplaying the state to exaggerating the state. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Afacan, Mustafa OguzEvdokimov, PiotrHakimov, RustamdjanTurhan, Bertan...
21页
查看更多>>摘要：When applying to schools, students often submit applications to distinct school systems that operate independently, which leads to waste and distortions of stability due to miscoordination. To alleviate this issue, Manjunath and Turhan (2016) introduce the Iterative Deferred Acceptance mechanism (IDA). We design an experiment to compare the performance of this mechanism under parallel markets (DecDA2) to the classic Deferred Acceptance mechanism with both divided (DecDA) and unified markets (DA). Consistent with the theory, we find that both stability and efficiency are highest under DA, intermediate under DecDA2, and lowest under DecDA. While IDA is not strategy-proof, we show theoretically that strategic reporting can only lead to improved efficiency for all market participants. The experimental results are consistent with this prediction. Our findings cast doubt on whether strategy-proofness should be perceived as a universal constraint to market mechanisms. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We introduce a game in which each player can allocate her endowment in a prize-linked savings (PLS) account, which awards a fixed prize only to a randomly chosen winner. Like Tullock's contest, the probability for each player of winning the prize is the ratio of her PLS deposit to the total deposits made by all participating players. We derive a unique equilibrium and further examine the effects of introducing PLS as an alternative savings option to standard savings (SS), which yields a fixed rate of return. Both theory and experiment agree that introducing PLS lowers each participant's SS amount. While the theory suggests that the effect of introducing PLS on total savings (SS+PLS) is ambiguous, we find in the laboratory that the effect is positive and significant. By varying the PLS prize and group size, both PLS and total savings increase as the average PLS prize per subject increases. (C) 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.
查看更多>>摘要：I consider environments where communication networks are endogenous, but monitoring rules enforce agents to ask consent from others to form new links or break their existing links. A monitoring rule consists of a number x and a collection of groups O such that each agent requires consent from x number of agents in every group she belongs to. First, I show that efficient networks can have at most one component when externalities are positive, whereas they can have multiple components when externalities are negative. Second, I find that partitioning set of agents into groups based on components of the efficient network forms "smallest groups " that can internalize all of externalities; therefore, they can stabilize the efficient network with minimum number of monitors. I relate this finding to the widespread adoption of "small work groups with few monitors " (like Quality Circles) by quality management programs to enhance communication between developers. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：A well-known axiom for proportional representation is Proportionality for Solid Coalitions (PSC). We characterize committees satisfying PSC as the range of outcomes obtained by the class of Minimal Demand rules, which generalizes an approach pioneered by eminent philosopher Sir Michael Dummett. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We consider independent private value auctions in which prior to bidding, each bidder engages in fully flexible information acquisition, choosing not only how much information but also what information to acquire about his value. Focusing on a tractable environment with binary underlying values and posterior-separable information costs, we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and investigate the effects of information costs on auction outcomes. We also analyze how the reserve price influences bidders' information-acquisition behavior and study its implications for the seller's expected revenue. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：We explore the implications of two central human biases studied in behavioral economics, reference points and loss aversion, in optimal stopping problems. In such problems, people evaluate a sequence of options in one pass, either accepting the option and stopping the search or giving up on the option forever. Here we assume that the best option seen so far sets a reference point that shifts as the search progresses, and a biased decision-maker's utility incurs an additional penalty when they accept a later option that is below this reference point. Our results include tight bounds on the performance of a biased agent in this model relative to the best option obtainable in retrospect (a type of prophet inequality for biased agents), as well as tight bounds on the ratio between the performance of a biased agent and the performance of a rational one. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
查看更多>>摘要：This article studies a wage posting game in which workers invest in human capital so as to reduce the disutility of labor. If investment were observable, then no workers would invest in skills due to the holdup problem, and all employers would offer the monopsony wage as in the Diamond paradox. With unobservable investment, however, the equilibrium wage and skill distributions are nondegenerate, despite agents being ex ante identical. An asymptotic efficiency result is obtained in which investment converges to the efficient level as the arrival rate of job offers tends to infinity, with firms receiving all the surplus in the market. The model generates distinctive comparative statics predictions, and the theory can rationalize any wage distribution that satisfies a few regularity conditions. The analysis is robust to the inclusion of some forms of direct search costs. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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