查看更多>>摘要：This essay functions as the introduction to a two-part special issue on Walter Veit’s recent monograph A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness published with Routledge in 2023. Veit introduces the purpose of this special issue and offers a summary of the first batch of commentaries.
查看更多>>摘要：What is the role of consciousness in nature? The science of consciousness has largely neglected the question through its emphasis on human experience. In this précis of A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness , I outline how we can move from a top-down approach that begins with investigations in humans to an evolutionary bottom-up approach that targets the adaptive origins of even the most minimal forms of subjective experience. I will also offer an introduction to the central thesis of the book, that is, the pathological complexity thesis, according to which consciousness evolved in order to enable animals to adaptively respond to their life history challenges.
查看更多>>摘要：In his book “ A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness ,” Walter Veit attempts to provide a philosophical foundation for the science of animal consciousness, especially focusing on hedonic evaluation. While he highlights an important aspect of phenomenal consciousness, several conceptual issues warrant further examination. The first one is the role of evaluation. Veit argues that hedonic evaluation explains the origin of consciousness, but it seems implausible for conscious animals to have the evaluative aspect alone. Instead, the origin(s) of consciousness may have linked to the capacity for making prediction that combine both perceptive and evaluative aspects. Second, it is necessary to distinguish between creature and state consciousness for discussing subjective unity. Autonomous movements of octopus arms do not necessarily imply multiple conscious subjects within one body. Alternatively, an octopus may experiences “switching” within a single phenomenal field between conflicting perceptions as in binocular rivalry. Lastly, the adaptivity of consciousness requires scrutiny. Just as different animal phyla show various body plans, the neuroarchitecture of consciousness may be implemented in different ways among animals. Specific mentalities may be fine-tuned to specific lifestyles, similarly to specific adaptation of animal bodies. It appears that the “adaptivity” of ground plans (e.g., vertebrate body and vertebrate consciousness) makes no sense or must be considered differently from the adaptivity of specific character states (e.g., the body shape and food preferences of a bat). The current analysis could help improve Veit’s proposal, linking it to previous accounts and establishing a solid philosophical foundation for this research field.
查看更多>>摘要：Facing stress and producing stress responses are crucial aspects of an organism’s life and the evolution of both its species and of the other species in its environment, which are co-evolving with it. Philosophers and biologists emphasize the importance of environmental complexity and how organisms deal with it in evolution of cognitive processes. This article adds to these discussions by highlighting the importance of stress physiology in processes connected to plant cognition. While this article supports the thesis that life means cognizing (i.e., sensing the environment, arranging internal processes according to that perception, and affecting the environment with its actions), it also emphasizes that there are various kinds of organisms. In this regard, plant cognition is not animal cognition. However, given both the variety and continuity in evolutionary processes and the similarities even between the distantly related organisms in the tree of life, I argue that it is usually useful to consider and compare physiological and molecular mechanisms in plants and animals as well as the concepts and research processes in animal and plant science. Although the “pathological complexity” thesis that Veit (2023) presents is fruitful in considering the evolution of consciousness and cognition, I argue that, when thinking of biological processes in relation to cognition, stress can be a helpful concept (maybe even as suitable as pathological complexity) in thinking of organisms’ responses to environmental complexity and their adaptation and acclimation processes.
查看更多>>摘要：Veit criticizes autopoiesis as a competitor with the pathological complexity thesis as an explanation for the origins of consciousness. I argue that this characterization of autopoiesis conflates what I call “autopoiesis 1.0” and “autopoiesis 2.0.” Autopoiesis 1.0, as originally construed by Maturana and Varela, disregarded environmental explanations and focused on autopoiesis as a specific class of mechanisms. Autopoiesis 2.0 is heavily influenced by Hans Jonas and other thinkers in the tradition of Naturphilosophie. Despite the similarity in name, this is quite different from Veit’s contribution to philosophy of nature in the sense of Dennett, Godfrey-Smith, and Sterelny. Veit’s project has much to offer autopoietic enactivists but it is different kind of project. This difference is crucial for assessing how these projects can contribute to each other.
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