首页|区块链赋能视角下危险货物道路运输安全监管演化博弈研究

区块链赋能视角下危险货物道路运输安全监管演化博弈研究

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为分析区块链技术在危险货物道路运输安全监管中的应用价值,利用演化博弈法建立由监管方、承运方和托运方构成的三方演化博弈模型,确定收益矩阵和复制动态方程,分析演化博弈系统中各均衡点的稳定条件.利用MATLAB对各利益主体的策略选择进行了动态演化分析,探究三方演化博弈中相关变量对三方演化策略选择的影响.结果表明:区块链的应用成本与各参与方的策略选择呈负相关;应用区块链技术对监管方合规监管、承运方和托运方遵守规定倾向的提升程度及应用区块链时监管方的补贴程度与各方的策略选择呈正相关;监管方责任规避系数与策略选择呈负相关,承运方和托运方的责任附加系数与策略选择呈正相关.
Research on the evolutionary game of road transportation safety supervision of dangerous goods from the perspective of blockchain empowerment
To analyze the application value and application influencing factors of blockchain technology in the safety supervision of road transport of dangerous goods,the three-party evolutionary game theory was introduced to construct a three-party evolutionary game model composed of the supervisor,the carrier,and the shipper.First,the game relationship among stakeholders was discussed in the transportation of dangerous goods,model assumptions were proposed,and the payoff matrix and replication dynamic equations were determined.Then,the equilibrium point and its stable conditions in the evolutionary game system were analyzed.Finally,MATLAB was used to analyze the dynamic evolution of the strategy choices of various stakeholders and to explore the influence of relevant variables in the tripartite evolutionary game on the choice of tripartite evolution strategies.The results show that the evolutionary stability strategy of the three-party game subject is affected by various factors such as the cost of blockchain,the degree of compliance supervision and compliance improvement that blockchain can bring,subsidy coefficient,liability avoidance,and additional degree.The application cost of the blockchain is negatively correlated with the strategic choice of each participant;the application of blockchain technology can improve the regulator's compliance supervision,the carrier's and consignor's tendency to comply with the regulations,and the regulator's subsidy for the application of the blockchain.The degree is positively correlated with the strategic choices of all parties;the liability avoidance coefficient of the regulator is negatively correlated with the strategic choices,and the additional liability coefficients of the carrier and shipper are positively correlated with the strategic choices.The above results can provide a decision-making basis for all parties in the dangerous goods transportation supervision system to choose whether to apply blockchain technology and can also provide a reference for the specific application of blockchain technology in the transportation of dangerous goods.

safety social engineeringdangerous goods transportationsafety supervisionblockchaintripartite evolutionary game

吴海涛、刘月

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西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院,成都 611756

综合交通运输智能化国家地方联合工程实验室,成都 611756

综合交通大数据应用技术国家工程实验室,成都 611756

安全社会工程 危险货物运输 安全监管 区块链 三方演化博弈

国家自然科学基金

51605398

2024

安全与环境学报
北京理工大学 中国环境科学学会 中国职业安全健康协会

安全与环境学报

CSTPCD北大核心
影响因子:0.943
ISSN:1009-6094
年,卷(期):2024.24(5)