Mechanism design and evolutionary game analysis of collaborative transboundary water pollution control in the basin from the perspective of ecological compensation
This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game theoretical model of transboundary water pollution in the basin,where the three-game subjects involved are the two neighboring regions of the basin and the basin management agency.This model aims to achieve collaborative management of water pollution in the basin,alleviate water pollution in the basin,and promote ecological restoration.First,a two-way ecological compensation-reward and punishment mechanism is introduced.Secondly,the stability conditions for the most ideal state of transboundary water pollution collaborative management in the basin are derived through the stability analysis method and simulated with an actual case,which is a pilot case of water pollution management and ecological compensation in Huangshan City and Hangzhou City of Xin'an River Basin.Results show that first of all the introduction of a two-way ecological compensation-reward and punishment mechanism can effectively promote the two neighboring areas of the Xin'an River basin to adopt the standard discharge behavior and promote the system to reach the(1,1,0)steady state.The result confirms the application value of the designed tripartite evolutionary game model of transboundary water pollution in the basin.Moreover,it is found that the combination of dynamic reward and punishment mechanisms helps the system evolve.From the perspective of the initial willingness,implementation effectiveness,and support propensity of the game subjects,dynamic reward and static punishment strategies are optimally regulated,with dynamic reward and dynamic punishment strategies following closely behind.Besides,it is important to note that the realization strategy of transboundary water pollution synergistic management in the basin is closely related to the cost and benefit of treatment of the two neighboring places to meet the standard discharge,the amount of two-way ecological compensation,the amount of ecological compensation rewards issued by the basin management agencies,and the cost and benefit of active supervision.
environmentalologywater pollutionevolutionary gameecological compensationdynamic reward and punishmentcollaborative management