Research on mechanism design and evolution path for synergistic governance of water pollution in watersheds:a case study of the Xin'an River Basin
The objective of this paper is to investigate the underlying principles and evolutionary trajectory of synergistic governance for water pollution in watersheds.Through this study,we aim to establish a clear understanding of the two-party joint and three-party evolutionary game models,as well as analyze the stability of the corresponding equilibrium state within the system.These models and analyses are built upon the theories of synergistic and evolutionary games.By simulating and analyzing the case of horizontal ecological compensation in the Xin'an River Basin and water pollution control in Hangzhou-Huangshan City,which falls within the jurisdiction of this basin,this study outlines the role path and realization strategy of synergistic management.The study reveals that:Firstly,the integrated water pollution control in the watershed requires cohesive territorial and intergovernmental management,where the amalgamation of sewage rights trading and ecological compensation mechanisms complements the evolving trajectory.Secondly,a pivotal external catalyst for the integrated governance involving multiple horizontal and vertical entities is the central government's proactive oversight.This oversight necessitates alignment with shifts in the benefits and costs among the key players,enabling adjustments to the input proportions and scale of operations as required.Central government inspectors must calibrate their inspection strategies to align with distinct stages of the governance process.This entails maintaining adequate inspection intensity for two-party territorial governance,while gradually reducing the intensity for three-party intergovernmental governance.This approach aims to optimize the efficacy of horizontal ecological compensation and other regulatory instruments within the market.In conclusion,our findings demonstrate that emissions trading and a two-way ecological compensation-reward and punishment mechanism can effectively incentivize the key players to mitigate pollution and encourage proactive governance behaviors in water pollution control.However,further optimization of the input proportions for the sub-factors in both cases is necessary.These results enrich the theoretical research in water pollution control and offer valuable insights for government regulatory decision-making.
万方数据
