首页|腐败治理效能如何影响中国城乡居民政治信任?——基于主观幸福感的中介效应分析

腐败治理效能如何影响中国城乡居民政治信任?——基于主观幸福感的中介效应分析

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基于CSS2019 调查数据,从腐败治理的视角出发,分析腐败治理效能对我国城乡居民政治信任的影响及其具体机制。描述统计结果显示:相较于城市居民,农村居民的差序信任格局更明显以及腐败治理效能感知更强。推论统计结果表明:腐败治理效能和主观幸福感会显著促进城乡居民的政治信任;腐败治理效能会通过提升居民的主观幸福感从而间接地促进城乡居民的政治信任;主观幸福感在腐败治理效能和城乡居民的政治信任之间发挥完全中介效应。因此,各级政府应加大反腐倡廉力度,增进民生福祉,重视"输出面"的公平,以提升基层政治信任,进而助推乡村振兴。
How Does the Effectiveness of Corruption Governance Affect the Political Trust of Urban and Rural Residents in China?——Analysis of Mediating Effect Based on Subjective Well-being
Based on the CSS2019 survey data,this paper analyzes the impact of corruption governance efficiency on the political trust of urban and rural residents in China and its specific influence mechanism from the perspective of corruption governance.The results of descriptive statistics show that compared with urban residents,rural residents have a more obvious pattern of hierarchical trust and a stronger perception of corruption governance efficiency.The results of inferential statistics show that corruption govern-ance efficiency and subjective well-being will significantly promote the political trust among urban and rural residents;that corrup-tion governance efficiency will indirectly promote political trust in urban and rural areas by enhancing residents'subjective well-being;and that subjective well-being plays a full mesomeric effect between corruption governance efficiency and the political trust of urban and rural residents.Therefore,governments at all levels should increase their efforts to combat corruption and promote in-tegrity,enhance people's well-being,and attach importance to the fairness of the"output side",in order to enhance grassroots political trust and promote rural revitalization.

effectiveness of corruption governancepolitical trustsubjective well-being

杨慧青、崔旭东

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贵州师范大学历史与政治学院(贵阳 550001)

贵州电子信息职业技术学院马克思主义教学部(凯里 556000)

腐败治理效能 政治信任 主观幸福感

国家社会科学基金重大项目国家民委中华民族共同体研究基地-贵州师范大学多民族文化融合与区域发展研究基地项目

ZOZDA0812021DJD04

2024

北方论丛
哈尔滨师范大学

北方论丛

CHSSCD
影响因子:0.192
ISSN:1000-3541
年,卷(期):2024.(3)
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