北京工业职业技术学院学报2025,Vol.24Issue(1) :33-38.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1671-6558.2025.01.007

绿色博弈:水环境治理PPP项目运营中的企业投机与政府应对

Green Game:Corporate Speculation and Government Response in Operation of PPP Projects for Water Environment Governance

黄洵 李宗耀
北京工业职业技术学院学报2025,Vol.24Issue(1) :33-38.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1671-6558.2025.01.007

绿色博弈:水环境治理PPP项目运营中的企业投机与政府应对

Green Game:Corporate Speculation and Government Response in Operation of PPP Projects for Water Environment Governance

黄洵 1李宗耀2
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作者信息

  • 1. 四川开放大学,四川 成都 610000
  • 2. 重庆大学,重庆 401331
  • 折叠

摘要

在"健全现代环境治理体系"与"绿色发展"战略导向下,水环境治理领域PPP项目被视为推动可持续发展的重要手段.然而,PPP项目运营过程中企业投机行为已成为影响项目成功的关键因素,亟须政府采取有效的监管策略.通过构建政府与企业间的演化博弈模型,对其进行机理分析和可视化数值仿真与验证,揭示监管与投机之间的内在联系及动态变化规律,提出减少企业投机概率的系统方法,为政策制定者提供理论依据和实践指导.

Abstract

Under the strategic guidance of"improving the modern environmental governance system"and"green development",PPP projects in the field of water environment governance are regarded as an important means to promote sustainable development.However,in the process of PPP projects operation,corporate speculation has become a key factor affecting the success of these projects,and it is urgent for the government to adopt effective regulatory strategies.By constructing the evolutionary game model between the government and enterprises,the mechanism analysis and visual numerical simulation and verification are carried out to reveal the internal relationship and dynamic change law between regulation and speculation,and a systematic method to reduce the probability of corporate speculation is proposed to provide theoretical basis and practical guidance for policy makers.

关键词

水环境治理/PPP项目监管/环境治理体系/企业投机/演化博弈

Key words

water environment governance/PPP project regulation/environmental governance system/corporate speculation/evolutionary game

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出版年

2025
北京工业职业技术学院学报
北京工业职业技术学院

北京工业职业技术学院学报

影响因子:0.408
ISSN:1671-6558
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