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"逻辑虚无论"的论证与反驳

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逻辑虚无论者认为,对于任何逻辑规律都可以找到"反例",这与逻辑一元论者所预设的逻辑的一般性相矛盾,因此不存在绝对一般的逻辑规律.对逻辑虚无论的反驳主要通过对逻辑一般性的辩护,但通过分析可以发现,这些反驳并不能提出一个非循环的标准,以严格区分自然语言中的逻辑与非逻辑部分,因此不能充分说明与证成逻辑的一般性.一个更适当的选择是,我们应该放弃关于逻辑的绝对一般性的预设而不是作为有效工具的逻辑.这种选择表明,逻辑的发展是一个拒斥对逻辑本质的先入之见的过程,我们应对不同的逻辑理论保持开放,而逻辑理论与科学可能也存在连续性.
The Argument and Refutation of Logical Nihilism
Logic nihilists believe that,for any law of logic,there could be a counterexample which con-tradicts the generality of logic presupposed by logical monists,so there is no absolutely general law of logic.The refutation of logical nihilism is mainly made through the defense of the generality of logic,but it can be found that these refutations can not offer a non-circular standard to distinguish the logical and non-logical parts in the natural language strictly,and therefore can not fully explain and justify the generality of logic.A better choice is that we should abandon the presupposition of the absolute generality of logic before we abandon logic as an effective tool.This choice shows that the development of logic is a process of rejecting the precon-ceived nature of logic,that we should remain open to different logical theories,and that logical theories may be continuous with science.

Logical PluralismLogical MonismLogical NihilismGeneralityNature of Logic

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中国人民大学哲学学院,北京 100872

逻辑多元论 逻辑一元论 逻辑虚无论 一般性 逻辑的本质

2024

贵州工程应用技术学院学报
毕节学院

贵州工程应用技术学院学报

影响因子:0.175
ISSN:2096-0239
年,卷(期):2024.42(4)