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奖惩机制下微信虚假健康信息治理的三方演化博弈分析

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微信是健康信息传播的重要社交媒体平台,也是虚假健康信息滋生和传播的沃土.在考虑用户、微信平台和政府在虚假健康信息治理中发挥不同作用的同时,引入奖惩机制,通过构建三方演化博弈模型探讨奖惩机制下治理微信虚假健康信息的最优策略和有效机制.在检验系统稳定性的基础上,运用MATLAB R2018b进行仿真实验.研究发现,合理的奖惩强度和奖惩系数、提高用户健康素养以及控制成本是影响各方主体进行有效策略选择的关键因素.据此提出虚假健康信息治理的政策建议,以营造清朗的健康信息传播网络空间.
Trilateral Evolutionary Game Analysis of WeChat False Health Information Governance under Reward and Punishment Mechanism
WeChat is not only an important social media platform for health information dissemination,but also a fertile ground for the breeding and dissemination of false health information.While considering the different roles played by users,WeChat platform and government in the governance of false health information,a reward and punishment mechanism was introduced,and the optimal strategy and effective mechanism for the governance of false health information on WeChat under this mechanism was discussed by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model.On the basis of checking the stability of the system,simulation experiments were carried out with MATLAB R2018b.It is found that reasonable reward and punishment intensity and coefficient,improving users'health literacy and controlling cost are the key factors that affect the effective strategy selection of all parties.Accordingly,policy suggestions are put forward,so as to create a clean online environment for health information dissemination.

reward and punishment mechanismWeChat platformfalse health informationinformation governanceevolutionary game

阮智慧、朱欣叶、卓扬凯、张帅、钱爱兵

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江苏卫生健康职业学院 公共卫生管理学院,江苏 南京 211800

南京中医药大学 卫生经济与管理学院,江苏 南京 210023

北京中医药大学 深圳医院,广东 深圳 518172

奖惩机制 微信 虚假健康信息 信息治理 演化博弈

国家社会科学基金资助项目

20BTQ053

2024

北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版)
北京邮电大学

北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版)

CHSSCD
影响因子:0.623
ISSN:1008-7729
年,卷(期):2024.26(3)