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基于前景理论的即时物流骑手交通违规监管演化博弈分析

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为治理即时物流骑手交通违规引发的道路交通安全问题,以前景理论替代期望效用理论,构建融入主观概率权重函数与价值函数的骑手违规配送监管演化博弈模型,分析了即时物流平台监管与骑手配送决策的互动关系与影响因素,进一步引入声誉激励机制构建骑手关于配送收入的决策行为影响模型,探究了平台对不同风险态度骑手违规配送治理的新思路.研究表明:骑手选择合规配送的比例与平台查处违规配送概率及罚金、骑手违规配送下交通事故发生概率及损失呈正相关,与骑手合规配送成本呈负相关,平台与骑手对高概率损失的风险偏好属性以及对积极监管与合规配送成本前景价值感知的低估,导致理想均衡稳定策略难以形成;不同风险态度骑手对平台声誉激励机制的反馈存在差异,平台通过引入声誉激励机制能够促进风险回避型骑手选择合规配送策略,而声誉激励机制对于风险偏好型骑手失效,此时平台通过设置合理额度的惩罚能够约束风险偏好型骑手选择违规配送策略.研究结果可为即时物流平台制定奖惩结合的监管策略提供理论参考.
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Traffic Violation Regulation for Instant Logistics Riders Based on Prospect Theory
In order to deal with traffic safety problems caused by traffic violation of instant logistics riders,replacing expected utility theory with prospect theory,an evolutionary game model of regulation of riders'non-compliant delivery was constructed,which integrated subjective probability weight function with value function.The interactive relationship and influencing factors between instant logistics platform regulation and riders'delivery decision-making were analyzed.The decision model of riders'selection of delivery strategies related to income was further established by introducing reputation incentive mechanism,and a new approach to the regulation of non-compliant delivery behavior of riders with different risk attitudes was explored.The results show that the proportion of riders'compliant delivery is positively correlated with the probability of investigating irregular delivery and fines,the probability of traffic accidents and corresponding losses,and negatively correlated with the cost of riders'compliant delivery.Platform and riders'risk preference attributes of high probability loss and underestimation of the prospect value perception of active regulation cost and compliant delivery cost make it difficult to form an ideal equilibrium stability strategy.Riders with different risk attitudes have different feedback on reputation incentive mechanism of platform.By introducing reputation incentive mechanism,the platform can promote risk-aversion riders to choose compliant delivery strategies.However,the mechanism fails to riders with risk preference,and the platform should restrict risk preference riders to choose irregular delivery strategies by setting reasonable penalties.The research results can provide a theoretical reference for the instant logistics platform to formulate a regulatory strategy combining rewards and punishments.

riders'traffic violationinstant logistics platformreputation incentiveprospect theoryevolutionary game

肖亮、李宏勇、余福茂

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浙江工商大学 现代商贸研究中心,浙江 杭州 310018

浙江工商大学 管理工程与电子商务学院,浙江 杭州 310018

浙江工商大学 工商管理学院(MBA学院),浙江 杭州 310018

骑手交通违规 即时物流平台 声誉激励 前景理论 演化博弈

国家社会科学基金项目教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目

19BGL09822JJD63001922JJD79008223YJCZH095

2024

10.19722/j.cnki.1008-7729.2024.0031

北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版)
北京邮电大学

北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版)

CHSSCD
影响因子：0.623
ISSN：1008-7729
年,卷(期)：2024.26(3)