Sci-tech innovation re-lending helps guide financial institutions to increase financial support for sci-tech enterprises and leverage social funds to promote technological innovation.This paper explores the necessity and ef-fectiveness of using sci-tech innovation re-lending as a long-term monetary policy tool by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model involving"bank financial institutions—non-bank financial institutions—enterprises".The study finds that the evolutionary game among the three parties tends to stabilize in a state where financial institu-tions do not enter the tech-financial market,and enterprises opt not to innovate,thereby"depleting"the innovative vitality of sci-tech enterprises.As an external factor,sci-tech innovation re-lending can alter the stability of the tripartite game in the tech-financial market and stimulate the innovation enthusiasm of sci-tech enterprises.There-fore,it is highly necessary to use it as a long-term monetary policy tool.The sci-tech innovation re-lending policy has incentive effects,constraint effects,indirect effects,and interest rate effects,which can drive both bank and non-bank financial institutions to innovate in tech-financial services,thereby meeting the financing needs of sci-tech enterprises and encouraging their innovation.Based on the study's conclusions,the paper suggests expanding the scope of support,issuing quotas based on the lending categories,strengthening supervision,and enhancing poli-cy coordination.
关键词
科技创新再贷款/科技创新/长期货币政策工具/演化博弈
Key words
sci-tech innovation re-lending/sci-tech innovation/long-term monetary policy tool/evolutionary game
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