Market Access Deregulation and Corporate Price Mark-ups:Empirical Evidence from the Pilot of Negative List System
By using the pilot of negative list system as a quasi-natural experiment,and by adopting the data on listed firms in China from 2008 to 2021 and a staggered difference-in-difference approach,this paper examines the impact of market access deregulation induced by the negative list system on firms'price mark-ups.The study finds that market access deregula-tion significantly reduces firms'price mark-ups,which holds true after taking account of a range of factors that may interfere with the estimation results.Mechanism tests show that market access deregulation reduces firms'price mark-ups through pro-competitive effects,while increasing firms'price mark-ups through productivity-enhancing effects.However,negative pro-com-petitive effects dominate,thus reducing firm price mark-ups overall.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the negative effect of market access deregulation on price mark-ups is significantly larger for industries with lower natural barriers,regions with lower institutional barriers,firms with higher levels of financing constraints,and private firms.The research work in this paper is of practical significance for a deeper understanding of the economic effects of market access deregulation and the direction of so-cialist market economy reform.
Market AccessPrice Mark-upsNegative List SystemPro-competitive EffectsProductivity-enhancing Effects
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