首页|"监督机制"还是"掏空行为":超额聘任独立董事与企业环保投资

"监督机制"还是"掏空行为":超额聘任独立董事与企业环保投资

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原文链接
  • 国家科技期刊平台
  • NETL
  • NSTL
  • 万方数据
以 2007-2021 年沪深 A股上市公司为研究对象，深入探究超额聘任独立董事对企业环保投资的影响效应及作用机制。研究发现:超额聘任独立董事对企业环保投资具有显著的促进作用，验证了超额聘任独立董事属于一种"监督机制";超额聘任独立董事通过抑制管理层短视和大股东掏空行为来促进企业进行环保投资;在重污染行业、两职合一以及独立董事薪酬较低的企业中，超额聘任独立董事对企业环保投资的促进作用更显著。
"Supervisory Mechanism"or"Tunneling Behavior"Over-appointment of Independent Directors and Corporate Environmental Investment
Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021 as the research object,this paper deeply explores the impact and mechanism of over-appointment of in-dependent directors on corporate environmental investment.The study found that over-appoint-ment of independent directors has a significant role in promoting corporate environmental invest-ment,that is,over-appointment of independent directors belongs to the"supervision mecha-nism".The mechanism test shows that the over-appointment of independent directors promotes the environmental investment of enterprises by inhibiting the short-sightedness of management and the tunneling of major shareholders.Further analysis shows that in heavily polluting indus-tries,two-in-one and low-paid independent directors,the over-appointment of independent direc-tors has a more significant role in promoting corporate environmental investment.

over-appointment of independent directorsshort-sighted managementlarge shareholders hollowed outenterprise environmental protection investment

熊磊、陈镜西、苏春、李先洪

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重庆理工大学 会计学院,重庆 400054

重庆银行 博士后科研工作站,重庆 400024

超额聘任独立董事 管理层短视 大股东掏空 企业环保投资

国家社会科学基金青年项目中国博士后科学基金面上项目重庆市博士后基金特别资助项目重庆市研究生科研创新项目

20CJY0402022M7206152022CQBSHTBT001CYS22684

2024

10.16339/j.cnki.hdxbcjb.2024.02.012

财经理论与实践
湖南大学

财经理论与实践

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子：1.112
ISSN：1003-7217
年,卷(期)：2024.45(2)
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