首页|产业型战略投资者与"僵尸"国企治理——基于股东与公司经营范围相似度的研究

产业型战略投资者与"僵尸"国企治理——基于股东与公司经营范围相似度的研究

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国有企业产权改革通过各类资本的融合与互补，促进国有企业高质量发展。棋至中局，如何进一步提升国有企业产权改革的效率备受关注。文章采用文本分析技术测量法人股东与企业经营范围的相似度，识别产业型战略投资者，研究了引入产业型战略投资者能否更好地提升国有企业经营效率。研究发现，与企业经营范围相似度较高的产业型战略投资者能够有效降低国有企业僵尸化程度，这种作用在产业型战略投资者持股比例高时更加显著。机制分析表明，产业型战略投资者能够发挥更加积极的监督治理效应和资源配置优化效应，表现为产业型战略投资者更加积极参与股东大会和委派董事参与国有企业治理，产业型战略投资者持股高的公司具有更高的商业信用水平、员工雇佣效率和经营绩效。文章研究表明，与公司经营范围较为相似的产业型战略投资者能够有效提升国有企业的经营韧性和效率，国有企业产权改革除了在股权和高层治理维度的混合外，还应在业务层面考虑股东经营业务的协同程度。文章拓展了国有企业产权改革的研究视角，对于进一步推进和完善国有企业混合所有制改革具有重要的政策参考价值。
Industrial Strategic Investors and "Zombie" SOE Governance:A Study Based on the Similarity of Shareholder-Company Business Scope
The property rights reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is the core of China's econom-ic system reform and an important path to build and develop a Chinese-style modern economic system. The re-form encourages SOEs to diversify their ownership structure through various forms,truly giving play to the coordination and cooperation of all kinds of capital. The focus of existing research has gradually shifted from the equity dimension to the executive governance dimension,but the discussion on the matching between shareholders and companies at the business level is still insufficient.This paper uses the text analysis technology to measure the similarity of business scope between compan-ies and their shareholders to identify industrial strategic investors,and then studies whether the reform of SOEs at the business level can improve the operational efficiency of SOEs. The results show that industrial strategic investors with higher business scope similarity can effectively reduce the zombification of SOEs,and this effect is more significant when the shareholding ratio of industrial strategic investors is high. Mechanism testing finds that industrial strategic investors can exert more active supervision and governance effects and re-source allocation optimization effects,manifested in their more active participation in shareholder meetings and appointment of directors to participate in SOE governance. Besides,companies with higher shareholdings held by industrial strategic investors have a higher commercial credit level,employment efficiency,and opera-tional performance.This paper shows that industrial strategic investors with relatively similar business scope can effectively improve the operational resilience and efficiency of SOEs. In addition to the mixture of equity and executive governance,the property rights reform of SOEs should also consider the coordination degree of shareholder operations at the business level. This paper expands the research perspective of SOE property rights reform and has important policy reference value for further promoting the mixed ownership reform of SOEs.

industrial strategic investorsSOE property rights reformoperational efficiencyenterprise zombification

刘潋、蔡贵龙、郑国坚、王艳

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中山大学管理学院,广东 广州 510275

中山大学现代会计与财务研究中心,广东 广州 510275

广东外语外贸大学会计学院,广东 广州 510006

产业型战略投资者 国有企业产权改革 经营效率 企业僵尸化

国家自然科学基金重点项目国家自然科学基金面上项目国家自然科学基金青年基金广东省自然科学基金面上项目国家社会科学基金重大项目

7213201072372168720022232022A151501109821ZDA039

2024

10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20240224.101

财经研究
上海财经大学

财经研究

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子：3.539
ISSN：1001-9952
年,卷(期)：2024.50(3)
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