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国有股东委派董事可以引导民营企业善待员工吗?

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立足于当前民营企业"反向混改"积极推进和ESG实践蓬勃发展的大背景,文章以2010—2020年存在国有资本参股的A股民营上市公司为样本,检验国有股东委派董事对民营企业善待员工的影响、机制及边界条件。结果发现,国有股东委派董事显著提升了民营企业的员工责任分数,有利于民营企业善待员工。机制分析表明,国有股东委派董事通过提供资源支持和增加社会关注促进民营企业履行善待员工的社会责任。异质性分析表明,上述结果在管理层短视程度较高、行业集中度较高以及劳动密集度较低的样本中更加显著。进一步考虑国有股东的异质性特征发现,当国有股东为战略型投资者以及与民营企业位于同一注册地时,其委派董事对民营企业善待员工的促进作用更加显著。文章从董事会层面混合治理的视角厘清了国资参股促进民营企业善待员工的机制和作用条件,为民营企业通过制度设计实现"高质量"混合以及借助"反向混改"的契机改善ESG实践提供了一定的启示。
Will Appointment of Directors by State-owned Shareholders Guide Private Enterprises to Treat Their Employees Well?
The appointment of directors to participate in board voting provides institutional protection for state-owned shareholders to exercise their rights. In addition, directors appointed by state-owned share-holders can gain more power of discourse due to their control over resources, and have the ability to affect management decisions in private enterprises. Currently, ESG has received widespread attention from scholars, but the issue of corporate infringement of employee rights is not uncommon in practice. Compared to state-owned enterprises, this issue is particularly prominent in private enterprises. How to guide private enterprises to treat their employees well and achieve the unity of economic value and social value? It needs an urgent re-sponse from the theoretical circles.Using A-share private listed companies with state-owned capital participation from 2010 to 2020 as the sample, this paper examines the impact, mechanism, and boundary conditions of state-owned shareholders ap-pointing directors on private enterprises' treatment of employees. The results show that the appointment of dir-ectors significantly improves the scores of employee responsibility and promotes better treatment of employ-ees in private enterprises. This is achieved by providing resource support and raising social awareness, espe-cially in private enterprises with higher managerial myopia, higher industry concentration, and lower labor in-tensity. The effect is more pronounced when state-owned shareholders are strategic investors and are in the same registered location as private enterprises.The possible contributions of this paper are as follows: First, it refines the research on "reverse mixed-ownership reform" with private enterprises as the research object to the director level, which further confirms the viewpoint proposed in previous literature that non-controlling shareholders' "effective governance" must involve "substantial participation". Second, it enriches and refines the research of ESG from the perspective of enterprises treating employees well, deepening the understanding on the impact of internal corporate gov-ernance structure arrangements on ESG practices. Third, it confirms that the mixed governance of directors ap-pointed by state-owned shareholders is an effective path to protect the rights and interests of employees in private enterprises, and finds out the effective governance mechanism to inspire private enterprises to treat their employees well.

state-owned shareholdersappointment of directorsreverse mixed-ownership reformwell treatment of employeesESG

钱爱民、肖亦忱、朱大鹏

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对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,北京 100029

上海立信会计金融学院会计学院,上海 201620

国有股东 委派董事 反向混改 善待员工 ESG

财政部"会计名家培养工程"项目国家自然科学基金重点项目国家自然科学基金面上项目

财会[2019]19号7233200271972134

2024

财经研究
上海财经大学

财经研究

CSTPCDCSSCICHSSCD北大核心
影响因子:3.539
ISSN:1001-9952
年,卷(期):2024.50(4)