首页|考虑海运竞争影响的中欧班列运营商竞合关系研究

考虑海运竞争影响的中欧班列运营商竞合关系研究

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中欧班列(简称班列)市场竞争分为内部竞争与外部竞争,内部竞争来自班列运营商间的同质化竞争,外部竞争来自海运的差异化竞争.目前班列正陆续开展区域化合作探索.为探究在海运竞争影响下,班列运营商采取何种竞合策略效益更优,分别构建合作与非合作模式下,两班列运营商与海运班轮公司竞争的博弈模型.同时考虑班列运营商间的地理位置差异,采用Hotelling模型分析合作模式下两班列运营商的收益分配.选取已初步开展合作的班列运营商相关数据及海运运营数据进行实证分析.研究结果表明:1)从市场化运营发展来看,班列运营商开展合作模式可同时提高自身均衡运价及总市场份额,更有利于班列市场的扩张;班列运营商可在开展合作模式的同时适当提高运价,进一步开放高附加值货物市场,促进班列的高质量发展.2)班列运营商可以统一定价的形式开展合作,以运输成本及空间地理位置差异产生的费用为依据明确各自运货量,实现合作模式下班列运营商效益分配的初步探索.3)若给定班列实际运营参数,可根据非合作模式班列运营商竞争强度对总收益的影响确定阈值点,当实际竞争强度小于该阈值时,班列运营商选择合作模式更优;班列运输时效性的增加对合作模式下班列运营商总效益的影响更为显著,可作为合作模式发展的优化方向.研究可为班列运营商竞争与合作决策及班列高质量发展提供参考.
Competition and cooperation between China-Europe Railway Express operators considering the shipping competition
The market competition of China-Europe Railway Express(CRE)is divided into homogeneous competition among CRE operators and differentiated competition from shipping,which represent internal competition and external competition.CRE operators try to make cooperation.To explore which co-opetition strategies of CRE operators are more effective when considering the impact of shipping competition,a game model of the competition between the two CRE operators and the liner shipping companies under the cooperative and non-cooperative modes was introduced.Considering the geographical location differences between train operators,a Hotelling model was adopted to analyze the revenue distribution between the two CRE operators in cooperative mode.A case study was conducted based on the relevant data of CRE operators that have initially cooperated and shipping operation data.The results show that:1)from the perspective of the development of market-oriented operation,the cooperative mode of CRE operators can simultaneously improve the balanced freight rate and total market share of CRE,which is more conducive to the expansion of the CRE market.CRE operators can appropriately increase freight rates in the cooperation mode,further open up the market for high-value-added goods,and promote the high-quality development of CRE.2)CRE operators can cooperate in the form of unified pricing,and clarify their respective transportation volumes based on the transportation costs and costs caused by spatial and geographical differences,and realize the preliminary exploration of the benefit distribution of CRE operators under the cooperation mode.3)Given the actual operating parameters of CRE,the threshold point can be determined according to the impact of the competition intensity of the CRE operators on the total revenue in the non-cooperative mode.When the intensity of competition between the two CRE operators is less than a certain threshold,the CRE operators would choose the cooperative mode.The increase in the timeliness of CRE has a more significant impact on the total efficiency of CRE operators under the cooperation mode,which can be used as the optimization direction for the development of the cooperative mode.This paper provides insights into the competition and cooperation decisions among CRE operators and the high-quality development of CRE.

railway transportationChina-Europe Railway Expressgame theorycompetitioncooperation

张晶蓉、马芳媛、周艳杰、李梦丽、李玉民、冯雪皓

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郑州大学 管理学院,河南 郑州 450001

浙江大学 海洋学院,浙江 舟山 316021

铁路运输 中欧班列 博弈论 竞争 合作

国家自然科学基金资助项目国家自然科学基金资助项目国家自然科学基金资助项目河南省社科规划决策咨询项目河南省高校智库研究项目

7220125272101041721712112022JC102023ZKYJ21

2024

铁道科学与工程学报
中南大学 中国铁道学会

铁道科学与工程学报

CSTPCD北大核心EI
影响因子:0.837
ISSN:1672-7029
年,卷(期):2024.21(2)
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