Using a sample of Chinese listed firms during the period of 2004-2020, this study examines the influence of mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises on independent directors' dissenting behaviors and further investigates the moderating effects of marketization. Our findings reveal that the degree of mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises is significantly positively associated with the likelihood and the number of dissenting opinions of independent directors, suggesting that mixed-ownership reform improves the monitoring role of independent directors. Moreover, the influence of mixed-ownership reform on dissenting behavior of independent directors is more pronounced for firms located in regions with lower marketization levels than those located in regions with higher marketization levels. Our findings are robust to a series of sensitivity tests. Finally, this study further finds that the positive association between mixed-ownership reform and dissenting behavior of independent directors only exists in state-owned enterprises controlled by local governments and in competitive industries. This study provides empirical evidence and useful reference for further deepening reform of state-owned enterprises.
关键词
国有企业/混合所有制改革/独立董事异议/市场化水平
Key words
state-owned enterprises/mixed-ownership reform/dissenting opinions of independent directors/marketization
维普
万方数据