This paper explores the impact of high-ability managers on budget slack,based on the sample of A-share listed companies in 2007-2021 and the budget information voluntarily disclosed in the annual reports and other announcements by listed companies,which is manually collected.The study finds that firms with high-ability managers had higher budget slack level,which break the halo effect perception of managers'competence.We explore the causes based on the fraud triangle theory and find that the high-ability managers have greater pressure on reputation maintenance,and the level of risk is lower,so they are more inclined to create budget slack.The high-ability managers can create stronger information asymmetry,which leads to more opportunities for them to create budget slack.The environmental uncertainty provides an excuse for the high-ability managers to create higher level of budget slack.On this basis,corresponding solutions were tested:providing reasonable excess compensation for managers,strengthening the quality of internal control and accelerating digital transformation,which can inhibit the high-ability managers create budget slack.
维普
万方数据