uBlock算法的低延迟一阶门限实现方法
Low-Latency First-Order Threshold Implementation of uBlock
姚富 1陈华 2范丽敏2
作者信息
- 1. 中国科学院软件研究所可信计算与信息保障实验室,北京 100190;中国科学院大学,北京 100049
- 2. 中国科学院软件研究所可信计算与信息保障实验室,北京 100190
- 折叠
摘要
目前已有文献给出了uBlock分组密码算法的侧信道防护方案,但是这些方案不仅延迟较高,难以适用于低延迟高吞吐场景,而且在毛刺探测模型下缺乏可证明安全性.针对这一问题,本文给出了在毛刺探测模型下具有可证明安全性的uBlock算法的低延迟门限实现方案.此外,我们引入了 Changing of the Guards技术来避免防护方案在执行过程中需要额外随机数.对于防护方案的安全性,我们用自动化评估工具SILVER验证了 S盒的毛刺探测安全性,并用泄露评估技术TVLA(Test Vector Leakage Assessment)验证了防护方案的整个电路的安全性.最后,我们用Design Compiler工具对防护方案的性能消耗情况进行了评估.评估结果显示,与序列化实现方式的uBlock防护方案相比,我们的防护方案的延迟能够减少约95％.
Abstract
The existing side-channel protection schemes for the uBlock algorithm suffer from high latency,making them unsuitable for low-latency and high-throughput scenarios.Additionally,these schemes lack provable security under the glitch-extended probing model.To address these issues,this paper presents a low-latency Threshold Implementation of the uBlock algorithm with provable security under the glitch-extended probing model.Furthermore,we introduce the Changing of the Guards technique to eliminate the need for additional random numbers during the execution of the protec-tion scheme.To validate the security of our protection scheme,we employ the automated evaluation tool SILVER to assess the glitch-extended probing security of the S-box and utilize the leakage evaluation technology TVLA(Test Vector Leakage Assessment)to verify the security of the entire circuit.Finally,we evaluate the performance overhead of our protection scheme using the design compiler tool.The evaluation results demonstrate that our scheme achieves a significant reduction in latency,approximately 95％less compared to serialized implementations of uBlock protection schemes.
关键词
密码芯片/uBlock算法/侧信道攻击与防护/掩码技术/门限实现/Changing/of/the/GuardsKey words
cryptographic chip/uBlock algorithm/side-channel attack and protection/masking/threshold implemen-tation/changing of the guards引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
国家科技期刊平台
NSTL
万方数据