Considering the preference of shippers for traceabil-ity information,a three-level shipping supply chain consisting of ports,carriers,and freight forwarders was constructed,with each party leading the construction of the blockchain traceability system.Combined cost sharing strategies,by using Stackelberg game model,the optimal pricing strategies under the benchmark mode and the three blockchain technology modes were compared and analyzed.In addition,the subsidy intensity and member pricing strategies under different govern-ment subsidy models were considered.The results show that blockchain technology is not always the optimal decision for members of the shipping supply chain,which is related to cost sharing ratio,shippers'preference for traceability informa-tion,and shipping document delay cost.When cargo owners have a high preference for traceability information and the cost of traceability is low,all parties should improve their tracea-bility level in order to increase their own profits.The govern-ment's fixed subsidy model cannot bring benefits to followers,while in the retroactive subsidy model,when the sharing ratio of shipping chain leaders exceeds a certain threshold,the in-crease in retroactive subsidy intensity will maximize the profits of the entire supply chain.
万方数据
维普
