首页|航运服务供应链中市场规模不对称时船公司的入侵和定价策略研究

航运服务供应链中市场规模不对称时船公司的入侵和定价策略研究

扫码查看
考虑航运服务供应链中船公司之间市场规模的不对称,运用Stackelberg博弈理论,建立船公司和货代的三阶段顺序博弈模型,确定船公司最优入侵和定价策略,研究市场规模占比对船公司入侵决策和供应链成员定价决策的影响.结果表明:无论船公司是否入侵,更高的市场规模占比总是为船公司带来更多利润;当船公司市场规模占比高、船公司之间运输服务替代程度低和入侵成本高时,船公司不入侵反而获得更多利润;当托运人对船公司的渠道入侵偏好程度较高或较低时,入侵为船公司带来的收益更多.
Encroachment and pricing strategies of shipping companies in the shipping service supply chain with asymmetrical market size
Considering the asymmetry of market size between shipping companies in the shipping service supply chain,by using Stackelberg game theory,a three-stage sequential game model between shipping companies and freight forwarders was established to determine the optimal encroachment and pricing strategies of shipping companies,and the impact of market share on shipping company encroaching decisions and supply chain member pricing decisions was studied. Results show that whether shipping companies encroach or not,the higher mar-ket share always brings more profits to shipping companies;when the market share of the shipping company is high,the substitution degree of transportation services between shipping companies is low,and the encroachment cost is high,the shipping company will gain more profits without encroach-ment;when the shippers have a higher or lower preference for encroaching channel,the encroachment will bring more bene-fits to the shipping company.

shipping service supply chainasymmetric market sharechannel encroachmentgame theory

邓鸿林、汪传旭

展开 >

上海海事大学 经济管理学院,上海 201306

航运服务供应链 市场规模不对称 渠道入侵 博弈论

国家自然科学基金资助项目

71974123

2024

大连海事大学学报
大连海事大学

大连海事大学学报

CSTPCD北大核心
影响因子:0.469
ISSN:1006-7736
年,卷(期):2024.50(3)