Analysis of Task Offloading Incentive and Computing Resource Pricing Mechanism in Edge Computing
This paper describes aend user cost compensation mechanism based on Stackelberg game and a pricing mechanism for idle resources of nearby servers.Firstly,utility functions are designed for end users,edge servers,and nearby servers,and their interactions are modeled as a three-stage Stackelberg game.Secondly,by backward deduction,the optimal amount of offloaded data that allows the end user to obtain maximum utility is obtained,on which the best reward paid by the edge server to the end users and its optimal amount of leased computing resources are further obtained.Finally,by analyzing the utility of nearby servers,the unit computing resource price that maximizes their utility is obtained.Simulation experiments show that the incentive mechanism designed can achieve Stackelberg equilibrium among end users,edge servers,and nearby servers.
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