At present,the platform economy,which relies on digital information and algorithmic technology,with huge potential production factors and a vast group of participants,has exerted a strong impact on the theoretical foundation and enforcement practices of the traditional antitrust law. The existing antitrust norms do not have a clear regulatory path for the self-preferential behavior that frequently occurs on current platforms. The complex-ity and specificity of the platform economy also make it difficult for antitrust regulation to be resolved under the framework of traditional antitrust theory,and thus law enforcement practice is often faced with the dilemma of unclear identification of self-preferential behavior,inability to determine the nature of monopoly,and even im-pediments to antitrust supervision.To address the difficulties in institutional standardization and law enforcement practice,it is possible to expand from internal systems to external practices,and from macroscopic top-level de-sign to micro-system supplementation,to improve the antitrust regulatory framework of self-preferential behav-ior of digital platforms,and to establish a targeted antitrust regulatory system,so as to contribute to the construc-tion of an orderly competitive market order and the innovation-driven and high-quality development of the market economy.
digital platformsself-preferential behaviorantitrust regulationmarket regulationcompetition order
维普
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