To ensure the accuracy of specialized fact-finding,parties should not only act as protectors of their own ap-praisal interests but also assume the role of error correctors within the broader criminal justice system.However,the current design of the criminal appraisal system is characterized by a"judicial dominance"and"investigation-appreciation unity"structure,which is a form of"non-informant justice".This design faces challenges such as informational bias hindering the discovery of appraisal errors,cognitive barriers limiting the proof of such errors,the conflation of responsible and cor-rective parties,a formal inclination in initiating error correction decisions,procedural inertia exacerbating the difficulty of correcting appraisal errors,and the limited scope of the error correction function.These challenges are insufficient to meet the institutionalized needs of criminal parties acting as"informants of the case facts"to correct appraisal errors.Optimizing the criminal appraisal system requires constructing independent procedures centered around the identity of criminal parties as error correctors.By implementing specific procedural operations to eliminate the institutional barriers to correcting ap-praisal errors,a mechanism for correcting appraisal errors that is distinct from the"non-informant justice"logic can be established.This enables criminal parties and public security judicial organs to return to the normative relationship positio-ning of a"positive-sum game".
judicial appraisalcriminal appraisal systeminvestigation-appraisal separationappraisal rights
万方数据
维普
