首页|混合所有制企业高管团队动态合作行为演化博弈分析

混合所有制企业高管团队动态合作行为演化博弈分析

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基于有限理性视角,运用演化博弈理论,构建了国企高管团队和私企高管团队动态合作行为演化博弈模型,探讨了违约罚金、政府奖励、合作成本、合作收益对高管团队合作行为演化的影响,并对其演化过程进行了数值仿真和相关分析.研究表明:混合所有制企业高管团队合作双方的最终策略将会稳定于合作与不合作策略,不会稳定于一方合作,一方不合作策略.其中,在一定范围内,增大违约罚金,增加政府奖励,减小合作成本,增大合作收益系数将会促使国企高管和私企高管合作行为由不合作向合作进行转变.研究以期为中国国企混改顺利推进,形成国企混改高效制度安排提供一定参鉴意义.
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Dynamic Cooperative Behavior of Top-management Teams in Mixed Ownership Enterprises
Based on the perspective of bounded rationality,this paper first constructed a dynamic game model of dynamic cooperative behavior to explore this problem.Secondly,it discussed the impact of contract fines,government incentives,cooperation costs,and cooperation revenues on the evolution of top-management team behavior.Finally,it carried out numerical simulation and correlation analysis on its evolution process.The research shows that the final strategy of the two sides in the cooperation of the senior management team of mixed ownership enterprises will be stable in the cooperation and non-cooperation strategy,and will not be stable in the cooperation and non-cooperation strategy of one party.Among them,within a certain range,increasing the penalty of contract,increasing government incentives,reducing cooperation costs,and increasing the coefficient of cooperation revenue can promote the transformation from non-cooperation to co-operation.We hope that this study can provide some reference significance for the smooth pro-gress of the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises and form efficient institutional arrange-ments.

mixed ownership enterprisetop-management teamcooperative behaviorevolution-ary gamereplicated dynamic equation

宋美、王振源、葛玉辉、刘举胜

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华东师范大学经济与管理学院,上海 200062

上海理工大学管理学院,上海 200093

上海政法学院经济管理学院,上海 201701

混合所有制企业 高管团队 合作行为 演化博弈 复制动态方程

国家自然科学基金教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金上海市一流学科建设项目上海政法学院青年教师国家社科基金培育项目

7207205717YJA630020S1201YLXKC-02-22-009-0401

2024

10.13306/j.1672-3813.2024.01.011

复杂系统与复杂性科学
青岛大学

复杂系统与复杂性科学

CSTPCD北大核心
影响因子：0.798
ISSN：1672-3813
年,卷(期)：2024.21(1)
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