Study on the Social Responsibility Fulfillment of Port Enterprises Under Government Regulatory Mechanism
In order to investigate the influence of government regulatory mechanisms on the fulfill-ment of social responsibility by port enterprises,the evolutionary game models of local govern-ments and port enterprises under different regulatory mechanisms are constructed and numerical simulations are conducted respectively.The study shows that there is no evolutionary stability strategy between the two parties under the static punishment,reward and punishment regulatory mechanism.Under the dynamic punishment,reward and punishment regulation mechanism,both parties can reach the only evolutionary stability strategy.The government's dynamic punishment regulation mechanism is better than the dynamic reward and punishment regulation mechanism.In this case,the maximum strength of punishment and the cost of government regulation affect the probability of port enterprises to fulfill CSR.Corresponding suggestions are provided for local governments to promote the fulfillment of CSR by port enterprises.
government regulationport companiessocial responsibilityevolutionary game
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