In the market of direct channels of manufacturers and retail channels of retailers,there is a relationship of conflict and cooperation between the two.After obtaining consumer information beneficial to sales,retailers will be affected by consumers'free-riding behavior and face the choice of whether to share the information with manufacturers.Manufacturers are faced with the choice of whether to share with the retailer any increase in profits from providing consumer information.By establishing a game theory model,this study analyzes the influence of information prediction accuracy,information sharing coefficient and revenue sharing coefficient on the profits of the two channel merchants,and then puts forward the revenue sharing contract.The research shows that when retailers share demand information with manufacturers,it is a win-win situation for all parties in the channel in terms of consumer free-ridership,and the manufacturer's initiative to share its own revenue with retailers is conducive to retailers'information sharing.Finally,an calculating example is given to intuitively illustrate the conclusion,and the feasibility and necessi-ty of the mechanism are also proved from the perspective of consumers.
Information SharingDemand ForecastingUncertaintyIncentivesChannel Integration
维普
万方数据
