The Logic of International Organizations'Responses to the Pressure from Dominant States:Adapt,Reshape or Resist?
The interaction between international organizations(IOs)and their dominant states is an important issue in the study of international relations.Dominant states often attempt to use IOs as a tool to advance their policy agendas,while IOs need to strike a balance between preserving their own interests and maintaining the trust of dominant states.Although the special relationship with dominant states may lead specific IOs to have a higher degree of dependence on them,it can also provide these IOs with more flexibility in response to the pressure from dominant states regarding their policies.This raises the question:Under what circumstances can IOs successfully resist policy pressure from dominant states,and when will they make compromises and concessions?To address this question,this article focuses on the distribution of domestic political conditions in the dominant state and the positions of major members within the IO,proposing a theoretical framework to explain the behavioral logic of IOs.The framework indicates that the choice of strategies by IOs in response to the pressure from dominant states is influenced by these two variables,leading to three different outcomes:"adaptation,""reshaping,"and"resistance".Through an analysis of three cases-the Reagan administration's demand for the World Bank to expand policy-based lending,the Bush administration's push for debt relief at the World Bank,and the Trump administration's pressure on the World Bank to terminate lending to China-this paper finds that the aforementioned theoretical framework can effectively explain the behavioral differences of IOs when responding to U.S.pressure under various circumstances.The research contributes to a deeper understanding of the autonomy of IOs and holds significant importance for grasping their role positioning and strategic choices in the context of great power politics.
international orgnizationsdominant state's positionautonomyU.S.foreign policyWorld BankInternational Development Association