首页|平台场域内中等收入人群"滑落"风险形成与治理机制——基于美团外卖骑手的案例研究

平台场域内中等收入人群"滑落"风险形成与治理机制——基于美团外卖骑手的案例研究

扫码查看
在中等收入人群绝对规模增加的过程中,也存在着"滑落"现象,以往对于中等收入人群的研究多从收入分配制度、人力资本等角度展开。通过美团案例的研究发现,中等收入人群"滑落"的根源为生态成员权责范围的模糊,"稳中"还需依赖平台治理。处于市场优势地位的美团,在供求失衡的市场机制和算法技术的支持下,通过灵活用工模式规避雇佣责任,但这种劳资关系并非稳定的和可持续的。外卖骑手可以通过自我赋能、维护自身主体性、多栖战略等途径抵御"滑落",同时,制度缺口填补、平台与政府协同治理、平台企业垄断规制和多元主体赋权的方式也可以阻断外卖骑手的"滑落"通道。外卖骑手"滑落"是研究橄榄型社会结构构建的经典案例,对我国完善平台治理结构和发展共同富裕具有积极意义。
The"Slipping"Risk Formation and Management Mechanism of Middle-income Group in The Platform Field:A Case Study Based on Meituan Takeout Riders
As the absolute size of the middle-income group increases,there is also a phenomenon of"slipping"within this group.Previous studies on the middle-income group often focused on income distribution systems and human capital.Through a case study of Meituan,we discovered that the root cause of this"slipping"lies in the blurred scope of ecological member rights and responsibilities,and that stability relies on platform governance.Meituan,as a company in a dominant market position,avoids employment responsibilities by utilizing a flexible labor model enabled by market imbalances and algorithmic technological support.However,this labor relationship is not stable or sustainable.Takeout riders resist"slipping"through self-empowerment、maintaining their agency and adopting a multi-faceted strategy.Research has shown that government participation in formulating social security measures、platform anti-monopoly actions and empowering diverse stakeholders can block the downward"slipping"channel for takeout riders.The"slipping"of takeout riders serves as a classic case study in constructing an olive-shaped social structure and holds positive implications for improving the governance structure of national platforms and promoting shared prosperity.

middle-income peopletakeout riders"slipping"riskplatform governance theory

曲亮、包冰乐

展开 >

浙江工商大学 工商管理学院,杭州 310018

中等收入人群 外卖骑手 "滑落"风险 平台治理理论

国家社科基金重大项目

21&ZD135

2024

管理案例研究与评论
大连理工大学

管理案例研究与评论

北大核心
影响因子:0.452
ISSN:1674-1692
年,卷(期):2024.17(1)
  • 1
  • 37