Trilateral Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Engineering Project Construction Quality Supervision under Reward and Punishment Mechanism
During the construction period of a project,how to prevent the moral hazard behavior of the participants is very important to improve the quality and safety of the project.In view of the rent-seeking behavior between the constructor and the supervisor in the construction stage of the project,this paper constructs a tripartite game model of the owner,the constructor and the third-party supervisor by using the evolutionary game theory,and studies the influence of the reward and punishment of the owner on the behavior strategy selection of the game subject.The results show that:the reward and punishment mechanism set by the owner should meet the condition that the sum of the reward and punishment amount of the owner to the constructor and the third party should be at least greater than the income when they choose speculation;the punishment of the owner plays a decisive role in the behavior choice of the constructor and the third party,while the reward plays a limited role.excessive rewards are not conducive to the owners'performance of their supervisory duties,and the administrative penalties imposed by government departments on the owners'speculation will play a significant role in improving the stability of project quality.increasing the rent-seeking cost is an effective way to reduce the speculative behavior of the construction party.
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
维普
