Research on market-oriented allocation mechanism and incentive contract for the separation of three rights of data elements
The market-oriented allocation of data elements is crucial to the development of digital economy in China,and the management of property rights of data elements is currently the main direction to solve the gap between supply and demand.However,at present,the lack of a unified right determination standard for data elements still exposes the data element market to problems such as unreasonable property rights allocation mechanism and imperfect property rights income distribution mechanism,seriously hindering the sustainable development of the data element market.In this case,it is urgent to further promote the innovation and improvement of the data element market-oriented allocation mechanism,and accelerate the evolution of data market entities towards cooperation,so as to achieve more accurate distribution of data property rights.By reviewing the characteristics and content of data derivative rights in existing literature,and considering the actual operation of the data market,data rights were hereby summarized into three main categories,including data holding right,control right,and usage right.Then,a dual multi-task delegation agent model was introduced.Besides,the configuration methods of the three data rights among market entities were explored,and the welfare effects of different configuration mechanisms were deeply analyzed to reveal the more efficient configuration mechanism.First,the situation that enterprises monopolize the right to hold,control and use data elements was discussed.When the data property right is monopolized,the data market cannot be in the optimal operation state,and there is a net loss of social welfare,which causes needlessly huge loss of consumer surplus and operator surplus.In order to achieve Kaldor-Hicks efficiency,market competition should be introduced,and the prices and transaction volumes under the competitive equilibrium maximize social welfare.Then,the situation that the enterprises retain the right to hold and control,and the Data Exchanges exercise the right of use was discussed,when the enterprises control the income structure of the data element market,so that the absolute dominance interferes with the production activities of other market entities,resulting in the poor circulation of data elements.In addition,in order to reduce uncertainty factors and risk costs,the Data Exchanges pursue one-sided profit maximization and take advantage of information advantages to take opportunistic actions,thus resulting in excessive waste of data elements.This phenomenon does not conform to the logic of property rights allocation,making it necessary to seek a three-right separation data element market allocation mechanism.Finally,the situation where the governments hold the holding right,the enterprises retain the control right and the Data Exchanges exercise the usage right was introduced.It is found that an efficient market-oriented allocation mechanism of data elements with the separation of three rights has the following characteristics:1)The enterprises only retain the residual control right,and reasonably allocate the incentive intensity of the two tasks,so that the increase and decrease mutually restrict each other,and the Data Exchanges are encouraged to allocate the effort level of the two tasks as needed,forming a flexible income distribution mechanism;2)The governments hold the residual claim and provide enterprises with a higher proportion of social benefit sharing to compensate for costs and risks in view of all the cases of higher payments for the completion of the two tasks,and trigger their willingness to cooperate with the Data Exchanges with high social benefit output;3)When the level of data desensitization efforts is not highly correlated with government incentives,or the government supervision is increased,the government can increase the share of social benefits by adjusting the tax ratio or providing partial transfer payments,and then the enterprises will be more willing to protect citizen privacy.In conclusion,it was hereby proposed for the first time to build a market-oriented allocation mechanism that separates data holding,control and usage rights.Research has justified the contribution of this mechanism to forming a reasonable data element property rights governance structure linked to reward payments and effort performance,which can effectively control the monopoly behavior of the data market,meet the needs of data market development and multilateral interests maximization,and provide innovative ideas for the reform of data element market-oriented allocation in China.
Data propertyMarket-oriented allocationProperty rights allocationIncentive contractPrincipal-agent model
万方数据
维普
