Is Inefficient Labor Investment a Failure of Compensation Incentives?—Evidence Based on Contract Reference Point Effect
With the aging of China's population,improving the efficiency of enterprise labor investment becomes an important means to optimize the allocation of macroeconomic factors and the competitive advantage of micro enterprises.Using the data of China's A-share listed companies,this paper empirically examines the impact of the reference point effect of executive compensation contract on the effi-ciency of enterprise labor investment.It is found that the less the executive compensation benefits compared to the contract reference point,the lower the efficiency of enterprise labor investment,and the above effects mainly exist in the vertical reference point and hori-zontal reference point dimensions.In addition,compared with the benefit area,the reference point effect of executive compensation con-tract has a higher impact on the labor investment efficiency in the loss area.Furthermore,the vertical reference point effect of executive compensation is significantly higher than the horizontal reference point effect.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the reference point effect of executive compensation contract is more likely to lead to excessive labor investment than insufficient labor investment.Compared with firms with high labor intensity,the impact of the reference point effect of executive compensation contract is greater in firms with low la-bor intensity.In addition,a sound supervision mechanism(analyst attention,corporate internal control)and incentive mechanism(ex-ecutive promotion expectation)can significantly alleviate the above effects.The findings of this paper can provide some management en-lightenment for improving the efficiency of enterprise labor investment from the perspective of compensation contract governance.
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
