管理者能力与贷款定价:来自某国有商业银行信贷数据的经验证据
Managerial Ability and Loan Pricing:Empirical Evidence from Credit Data of a State-owned Commercial Bank
唐亚军 1袁淳 2孙健 2马云飙2
作者信息
- 1. 中央财经大学会计学院,北京 100089;西藏大学财经学院,拉萨 850000
- 2. 中央财经大学会计学院,北京 100089
- 折叠
摘要
本文以某国有商业银行2009-2018年的贷款数据为研究样本,研究了管理者能力对贷款定价的作用机理与影响结果.本文发现,管理者能力与贷款定价显著负相关,经过工具变量及一系列稳健性检验后结论依然成立;机制检验表明,管理者能力影响银行贷款定价是通过降低企业风险、提升企业信息质量和缓解代理冲突实现的.在进一步研究中发现,在民营企业、不受到产业政策支持的企业,以及处于金融市场化程度更高的环境中的企业里,管理者能力对降低贷款利率的作用更加显著.本文不仅丰富了管理者能力与贷款定价两个领域的文献,也为实践中将管理者能力作为贷款定价因素,激发企业家精神、提升银行资源配置能力提供了经验证据.
Abstract
This paper examines the mechanism of how managerial ability acts on loan pricing and the resultant effect.We use a proprieta-ry loan data of a state-owned commercial bank from 2009 to 2018 as sample and find that managerial ability is significantly negatively as-sociated with loan pricing.The conclusion holds after using instrumental variables and conducting a series of robustness tests.Mechanism tests show that high-ability managers can reduce loan interest rate by reducing firm risk,improving firm information quality and allevia-ting proxy conflicts.Further analysis shows that the influence of managerial ability on loan pricing is more significant in non-state-owned firms,firms not supported by industrial policies and firms exposed to a more market-oriented financial market.This paper not only enri-ches the literature in the fields of managerial ability and loan pricing,but also takes managerial ability as a loan pricing factor in prac-tice,thus providing empirical evidence for stimulating entrepreneurship and improving banks'resource allocation ability.
关键词
管理者能力/贷款定价/企业风险/信息质量Key words
managerial ability/loan pricing/enterprise risk/information quality引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71872199)
国家自然科学基金面上项目(72272169)
国家社会科学基金一般项目(21BGL095)
北京市社会科学基金项目(20JJB015)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金()
中央财经大学科研创新团队支持计划()
西藏大学校级培育基金项目(ZDCZJH19-08)
西藏大学校级培育基金项目(ZDCZJH20-05)
西藏文化传承发展协同创新中心2022年招标课题()
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据