内部竞争情境下的生产平台化及其协调策略研究
A Study of Production Platformization and Its Coordination Strategy Based on Internal Competition
邹佳 1马小霞2
作者信息
- 1. 山西财经大学管理科学与工程学院,太原 030006;山西财经大学平台经济研究院,太原 030006
- 2. 山西财经大学平台经济研究院,太原 030006
- 折叠
摘要
本文在内部多产品间具有竞争关系的情境下,对生产企业是否进行平台化转型的选择、平台化基础上的内部竞争协调及其社会福利影响进行研究.首先基于内部竞争情境构建了企业内部的横向差异化竞争模型和"平台企业-生产代理人"的委托代理模型,然后通过求解和比较平台化生产和非平台化生产的均衡利润,以及构建社会福利函数得出以下结果:企业用于增加产品种类的单位固定成本越低,越倾向于平台化,但由于生产代理人的价格转嫁效应,平台化选择会导致内部竞争的加剧并使社会福利受损;平台化后的企业通过调整价格结构减弱生产代理人的价格转嫁能力,不仅可以增强自身平台化的激励,同时也能够在社会福利层面实现帕累托改进.
Abstract
This paper investigates whether a manufacturer of internally competing products would platformize itself,how the platformiza-tion-based internal competition is coordinated,and what effect will be generated on social welfare.Firstly,the competition model of hori-zontal differentiation within a manufacturer and the principal-agent model with platform as the principal and producer as the agent are constructed based on the internal competition situation.Then,by solving and comparing the equilibrium profits of platformized and non-platformized production,and constructing a social welfare function,we draw the following conclusions:the lower fixed unit cost a manu-facturer spends on diversifying its products,the more inclined it is to platformize itself,but the platformization leads to increased internal competition to the detriment of social welfare due to the price pass-through effect of production agents;by adjusting the price structure to weaken the price pass-through effect of production agents,platformized manufacturers can not only enhance their own incentives for plat-formization,but also achieve Pareto improvements at the social level.
关键词
内部竞争/平台化/协调/社会福利Key words
internal competition/platformization/coordination/social welfare引用本文复制引用
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
万方数据