共同机构投资者对管理者短视的影响研究
Influence of Common Ownership onManagerial Myopia
王璟 1陈胜蓝2
作者信息
- 1. 内蒙古大学经济管理学院
- 2. 浙江工业大学经济学院
- 折叠
摘要
基于2011～2020年中国上市公司的数据,通过文本分析的方法构建管理者短视指标,并考察共同机构投资者对管理者短视的影响.研究表明,共同机构投资者对管理者短视具有显著负向影响;共同机构投资者可以通过加强对公司的监督和提高公司治理水平来降低管理者短视,也可以降低大股东的退出威胁进而缓解管理者的外部压力来降低管理者短视.进一步研究发现,共同机构投资者主要影响非国有企业的管理者短视,而对国有企业的影响则不显著;长期型的共同机构投资者对公司管理者短视产生显著影响,而短期型的共同机构投资者对管理者短视的影响并不显著.
Abstract
Based on the data of Chinese listed companies in 2011～2020,this study constructs the managerial myopia index through the method of text analysis,and examines the influence of common ownership on the managerial myopia.The results show that common ownership has a significant nega-tive impact on the managerial myopia.Common ownership can strengthen the supervision of compa-nies and improve the level of corporate governance to reduce the managerial myopia;it canalso reduce the threat of the withdrawal of major shareholders,thereby relieving the external pressure of manag-ers and reducing the managerial myopia.Further research shows that common ownership mainly af-fects the managerial myopia of non-state-owned enterprises,but the impact on state-owned enterprises is not significant.It is mainly the long-term common ownership that has an impact on the managerial myopia,and the short-term common ownership has no significant impact on the managerial myopia.
关键词
共同机构投资者/管理者短视/公司治理/文本分析法Key words
common ownership/managerial myopia/corporate governance/text analysis methods引用本文复制引用
基金项目
国家社会科学基金资助项目(22FJYB014)
出版年
2024
NETL
NSTL
维普
万方数据