A game study on drug supply and refund under normalized centralized procurement in China
Objective To solve the problems of drug supply and refund in the normalized centralized procurement,promote the sustainable development of the three medical linkage,and promote the healthy operation of the normalized centralized procurement in China.Methods Based on the evolutionary game theory,a model was constructed for the decision-making behavior of the three main bodies of medicine enterprises,public medical institutions and government departments in the normalized centralized procurement of drugs,and the stable evolution strategy of the behavior choice of each subject was obtained through the model solution.Results The amount of fines for public medical institutions failing to repay in time,the losses caused by pharmaceutical companies failing to supply drugs in time,the incentive of balance retention funds and the amount of loans required by pharmaceutical companies had an impact on the evolutionary stability results.Conclusions The promotion of scientific supervision by government departments in the early stage of normalized collection can promote the timely supply of drugs by pharmaceutical enterprises and the timely payment back by medical institutions.It is suggested to increase the incentive of medical insurance balance fund in public medical institutions,optimize the direct settlement of medical insurance fund and promote the fine management of public medical institutions,which are conducive to achieving a stable equilibrium point and can provide impetus for the sustainable and healthy development of the three medical linkage.
centralized procurement with volumereimbursementpharmaceutical companiespublic medical institutionsgame
万方数据
维普
