Non-family shareholders'over-appointment of directors and corporate accounting information quality-Empirical Evidence from Listed Family Firms
How to recognize the behavior of shareholders'over-appointment of directors and effectively regulate the decision-making mechanism of the board of directors has become an urgent issue in the field of corporate governance.Existing studies have mainly explored the impact of controlling shareholders'over-appointment of directors on the economic decision-making behavior of enterprises,and there is little literature discussing the perspective of non-controlling shareholders'over-appointment of directors.In view of this,this paper takes listed family firms in China from 2008 to 2021 as the research object and examines in depth the relationship between over-appointment of directors by non-family shareholders and the quality of corporate accounting information.It is found that over-appointment of boards by non-family shareholders reduces corporate accounting information quality.Mechanism analysis shows that non-family shareholders'over-appointment of boards of directors exacerbates Type I agency conflicts,which in turn leads to a decrease in the quality of corporate accounting information.Further research finds that the negative effect of over-appointment of directors by non-family shareholders on the quality of corporate accounting information is more significant when the quality of internal control is lower,the firm is in a non-digital transition period,external audit supervision is weaker,and the regional marketization process is slower.The analysis of economic consequences suggests that the over-appointment of directors by non-family shareholders decreases the quality of accounting information,thereby increasing the risk of a firm's stock price collapse.In other words,the quality of accounting information partially mediates between these two factors.
family firmsnon-family shareholdersover-appointed directorsagent conflictquality of accounting information
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
