The Effectiveness of Executive Compensation Contracts and the Fulfillment of Performance Commitments in Mergers and Acquisitions
Corporate executives are undoubtedly an important factor affecting the fulfillment of performance commitments in mergers and acquisitions.Currently,relevant research mainly focuses on executive cognition,but there is little research on the impact of executive compensation contracts closely related to executive interests.From the perspective of the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts,using A-share listed companies with mergers and acquisitions and in the commitment period as research samples,and measuring the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts based on executive pay-performance sensitivity,this paper finds that the higher the executive pay-performance sensitivity,the higher the completion rate and likelihood of performance commitments.The paper attributes the mechanism to the positive externality or"spillover effect"of executive compensation contracts on performance commitment fulfillment,as well as the"reverse effect"of performance commitment compensation terms,and verifies them from the perspectives of corporate property rights and performance commitment reparation methods.The paper has reference value for further improving the performance commitment fulfillment mechanism,and also expands the research literature on the externalities of executive compensation contracts.
executive compensation contractpay-performance sensitivitymerge and acquisitionsperformance commitment
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