首页|荀子法哲学认知论基础及其价值

荀子法哲学认知论基础及其价值

扫码查看
知性是荀子礼法思想的基石.荀子扬弃孟子"尽心、知性、知天"的心性论主张,将性解构为情性与知性两层,进而提出了人作为知性主体,万物作为认知客体的认知模式,基于此提出独具一格的法治思想.圣王将知性发挥极致以制定法则,常人则通过知性理解礼法的客观实在性和有效性以理解并遵守规范.这是沃格林所谓由紧凑型宇宙论到生存论分化中的理智性神显论证,荀子及其圣王通过开发知性来回应神性显现.为捍卫已然分化了的生存实在,设定以知止成善作为认知目标和限度,保持礼法在固守与开放之间的均衡,主张既要固守礼法刑名,也要适时造作法制新名,在司法实践活动中充分发挥知性以适用法律.荀子提出的认识论对其礼法思想塑造有重要意义,是型构中国传统法治的重要节点.
Cognitive Basis and Significance of Xuntzu's Legal Philosophy
Intellectuality is the foundational element of Xuntzu's philosophy on rites and law.Xuntzu diverged from Mencius by discarding the theory of innate knowledge and goodness and divided human nature into emotional and intellectual dimensions.He further proposed a cognitive model where humans are the subjects of intellectuality and all things are the objects of cognition.Based on this,he articulated a unique legal philosophy:the sage-king maximizes the development of intellectuality to transform nature and establish laws,while ordinary people use their intellectuality to understand the objective reality and effectiveness of rites and laws,thereby comprehending and adhering to norms.This approach aligns with Voegelin's transition from a compact cosmological rationale to a differentiated existential philosophy,where Xuntzu and his sage-kings cultivated intellectuality as a response to divine manifestation.To defend the differentiated existential reality,they set"knowing to stop is goodness"as the cognitive goal and limit,maintaining a balance between the adherence to and openness of rites and laws.Xuntzu advocated for both the steadfast adherence to rites,laws,and penal designations,and the timely creation of new legal terms,fully utilizing intellectuality in judicial practice to apply the law.Xuntzu's epistemology significantly shaped his thoughts on rites and law,marking an important node in the formation of traditional Chinese legal philosophy.

Xuntzucognitionrites and lawlegal developmentVoegelin

吕川

展开 >

广东工业大学 法学院,广东 广州 510520

荀子 认知 礼法 法发展 沃格林

2024

管子学刊
齐文化研究院

管子学刊

CHSSCD
影响因子:0.116
ISSN:1002-3828
年,卷(期):2024.(4)