Dynamic Evolution Analysis of Low-carbon Transformation of Thermal Power Enterprises under Carbon Emission Supervision
杨秀棋 1李彦斌 1王佳妮 1李赟 2张佳珏1
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作者信息
1. 华北电力大学经济与管理学院,北京 102206
2. 华北电力大学国家能源发展战略研究院,北京 102206
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摘要
"双碳"目标下,为保证火电企业高质量发展,推进其低碳转型,构建了基于古诺模型的火电企业发电量决策模型,在此基础上,构建碳排放监管下火电企业投资二氧化碳捕集、利用与封存(Carbon Capture,Utilization and Storage,CCUS)的演化博弈模型,通过仿真分析,探讨了我国未来不同碳排放监管场景下火电企业低碳转型的动态演化趋势,结果表明,初始碳配额和CCUS技术投资成本较高时,火电企业投资CCUS技术意愿下降,导致均衡朝着不理想的状态演化;在合理的范围内,适当提高碳交易单价、CCUS技术的减排效率及政府罚金,会驱动火电企业投资CCUS.最后提出了针对性的政策建议,为我国引导火电企业清洁化转型提供有效支撑.
Abstract
In order to ensure the high-quality development of thermal power enterprises and promote their low-carbon transformation under the"carbon peaking and carbon neutrality"target,we developed a Gounod model-based decision model for thermal power generation.On this basis,we constructed an evolutionary game model of thermal power enter-prises'investment in Carbon Capture,Utilization and Storage(CCUS)under carbon emission regulation.Through sim-ulation analysis,we explored the dynamic evolution trend of thermal power enterprises'low-carbon transition under dif-ferent future carbon emission regulation scenarios in China.The results show that when the initial carbon quota and CCUS investment costs are high,thermal power companies are less willing to invest in CCUS technology,which leads to the evolution of the equilibrium towards an undesirable state.Within a reasonable range,an appropriate increase in the unit price of carbon trading,the emission reduction efficiency of CCUS technology and the government penalty will drive thermal power companies to invest in CCUS.Finally,we put forward targeted policy recommendations to provide effec-tive support for China to guide thermal power companies'clean transformation.
关键词
火电企业/低碳转型/演化博弈/CCUS/政策建议
Key words
thermal power enterprises/low carbon transition/evolutionary games/CCUS/policy recommendations
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