Research on the Evolutionary Game of Regional Brand Agricultural Product Quality Maintenance
In view of frequent quality and safety incidents of agricultural products,this paper starts with maintaining the quality of regional brand agricultural products,discusses the production and processing fields of regional brand agricultural products,introduces external rewards and punishments,internal sampling rate and cooperation mechanism,constructs the evolutionary game payment matrix of enterprises and farmers for regional brand agricultural product quality maintenance cooperation,and obtains the equilibrium solution of the game.Based on the case study of"Renfeng watermelons",the paper simulates the influence of yield transfer proportion,cost bearing proportion,profit spillover coefficient and supervision probability on the quality of regional brand agricultural products.The results show that the comparatively lower income spillo-ver,the relatively fair income transfer of benefits and cost bearing,the slightly higher supervision probability,and the effective sampling rate,as well as the degree of rewards and punishments are beneficial for the enter-prises and farmers to converge to their ideal state at a faster speed.
regional brandsagricultural product qualitymaintenancethe evolutionary game
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