In order to explore the changes in corporate decisions when the pricing right for transfer price is transferred from the manufacturer to the recycler,in view of the two situations of whether the recycler has the pricing right for transfer price,and considering recycling competition and competition between new and remanufactured products,the variation laws of recycling price,new product output,and remanufactured product output in equilibrium are analyzed using symmetric game theory.The study found that when the manufacturer has the pricing right for transfer price,the transfer price,re-cycling price,and outputs in equilibrium all have a monotone linear relationship with the price of new parts(returns from the processing of recycled parts).When the recycler has the pricing right for transfer price,the transfer price and the manufacturer's recycling price in equilibrium have nothing to do with the price of new parts,but are negatively related to the returns from the processing of recy-cled parts.When consumers clearly prefer the manufacturer's recycling channel,compared to the manufacturer with pricing right,the third-party recycler with the pricing right for transfer price can effectively cut down the equilibrium transfer price,which is more beneficial to the manufacturer.
remanufacturing output competitionrecycling pricetransfer pricethird-party recyclersymmetric game
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