Executive Compensation Incentive,Strategic Change and Total Factor Productivity of Resource-Based Enterprises
This study investigates the relationship between executive compensation incentives and the total factor productivity of resource-based enterprises,utilizing data from China Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share resource-based listed companies from 2012 to 2023.The findings indicate that:(1)Executive compensation incentives exhibit an inverted U-shaped effect on the total factor productivity of resource-based enterprises.This impact is particularly pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises,enterprises situated downstream in the industrial chain,and resource-based enterprises during their growth and decline phases.(2)Strategic change serves as an intermediary mechanism linking executive compensation incentives to the total factor productivity of resource-based enterprises.Appropriately calibrated executive compensation incentives facilitate strategic change within these enterprises,subsequently enhancing their total factor productivity.Conversely,excessively high executive compensation incentives may impede strategic change,thereby diminishing total factor productivity.(3)Product market competition exhibits an inverted U-shaped moderating effect on the relationship between executive compensation incentives and the total factor productivity of resource-based enterprises.This competition smooths the curve and shifts the turning point to the right.Enhancing the level of competition within the product market can optimize the efficacy of executive compensation incentives,mitigate the rate of detrimental effects,and support the long-term strategic role of these incentives.The conclusion have important decision enlightenment for resource-based enterprises to reasonably formulate incentive contract of executive compensation and improve total factor productivity.
万方数据
维普
