Evolutionary Game Analysis of Production Decision and Government Regulation in Traditional Chinese Medicine Enterprises
There is a game relationship between the production decision-making of traditional Chinese medicine enterprises and the selection of government regulatory strategies.By constructing an evolutionary game model be-tween traditional Chinese medicine production enterprises and government regulation,this study analyzes the im-plementation effects of production decisions of traditional Chinese medicine enterprises under different regulatory policies,explores the ways in which traditional Chinese medicine enterprises adjust production decisions to a-chieve overall system efficiency improvement,and analyzes the main impact of government regulatory strategies on production decisions of traditional Chinese medicine enterprises.The results indicate that in the game between traditional Chinese medicine enterprises and the government,the cost of government regulation,the punishment and reward from superiors to regulatory authorities,and the benefits,punishment,and compensation to consumers of traditional Chinese medicine production enterprises are important factors affecting the production decisions of traditional Chinese medicine enterprises.It is suggested that the government should establish a scientific and rea-sonable regulatory process for traditional Chinese medicine enterprises,and formulate targeted reward and punish-ment measures for the development stage of the traditional Chinese medicine industry and the development process of traditional Chinese medicine enterprises.
traditional Chinese medicine enterprisesproduction decision-makinggovernment regulationevolutionary game
NETL
NSTL
万方数据
