Tripartite Game Simulation of Voluntary Carbon Emission Reduction by Enterprises Under Bidirectional Mechanism
Carbon emission reduction in industrial enterprises is particularly important for balancing environmental protection and economic development.The factors influencing the voluntary carbon emission reduction of enterprises were explered based on the bidirectional mechanism of government and consumers.The evolutionary stability of each participant's strategy choice is analyzed by constructing a Tripartite Evolutionary Game model of government,enter-prises and consumers based on the government's positive incentive mechanism and the consumer's anti-driving mechanism.The stability of the equilibrium point in the Tripartite Game System is further analyzed by exploring the influence mechanism of each parameter on the voluntary carbon emission reduction of enterprises from the perspec-tive of system dynamics when different strategies are chosen by the three subjects.The results show that the proba-bility of choosing voluntary emission reduction strategy is positively correlated with the parameters of the amount of benefits brought to enterprises by consumers'low-carbon consumption and government non-material incentives,the subsidy rate of emission reduction costs,government bonuses,and the amount of loss of enterprises'carbon disclo-sure;and negatively correlated with the parameters of enterprises'low-carbon marketing costs,the value of green points,and consumption pollution.Finally,MATLAB 2016a numerical simulation is used to verify the above con-clusions and put forward relevant suggestions in the context of practice.
bidirectional mechanismvoluntary carbon emission reductionpositive incentive mechanismanti-driving mechanismTripartite Evolutionary Game
万方数据
维普
