Analysis of the Evolutionary Game of the Introduction of Private Capital by Financial Leasing Enterprises Under the Background of Mixed Ownership Reform
Through the mixed adjustment of the equity structure,the mixed ownership reform combines the advantages of state-owned capital and private capital to achieve the goal of creating value together.Fo-cusing on the financial leasing industry,based on the establishment of an evolutionary game model,this study analyzes the formation process and convergence trend of the integration strategy between the state-owned capital of state-owned financial leasing companies and the potential private capital in the market be-fore the mixed-ownership reform is truly promoted,and simulates the dynamic impact of factors such as ex-ante transaction costs and policy incentives on the strategy selection of game subjects.The results show that there is a stable strategic equilibrium between the state-owned capital and the potential private capital of the state-owned financial leasing companies,and whether the two parties can realize the capital depends on the ex-ante transaction costs,policy incentives and the expected returns of the newly established mixed-ownership enterprises.Policy incentives have a positive impact on the choice of integration strategy.The higher the expected net income of the newly formed mixed-ownership enterprises,the greater the willing-ness of state-owned capital and non-state-owned capital to choose to enter the market.At the same time,reducing ex-ante transaction costs can also effectively promote the participation of state-owned capital in the mixed-ownership reform,and the probability of non-state-owned capital entering the market tends to increase.
万方数据
维普
