Mispricing of Asset and Managers'Pay-Performance Sensitivity
Using the sample of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2010 to 2020,this paper empirically tests the impact of asset mispricing on the managers'pay-performance sensitivity.we find that asset mispric-ing significantly inhibits the managers'pay-performance sensitivity.The mechanism analysis shows that agency costs and information opacity are the main influencial channels for asset mispricing infulcing the managers'pay-performance sensi-tivity.Further analysis shows that,management power significantly strengthens the inhibitory effect of stock price under-valuation on the managers'pay-performance sensitivity.Compared with other enterprises,the inhibitory effect of stock price overvaluation is more obvious in state-owned enterprises and enterprises with higher internal control quality.The results enrich the research on the impact of asset mispricing on corporate behavior,and provide decision-making refer-ence for improving executive compensation incentives and contract design.
mispricing of assetmanagers'pay-performance sensitivityagency costcorporate governance
万方数据
维普
